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Abstract
In the automobile industry, as in many tradable goods markets, firms usually earn their
highest market share within their domestic market. The goal of this paper is to disentangle
the supply- and demand-driven sources of the home market advantage. While trade costs, for-
eign production costs, and taste heterogeneity all matter for market outcomes, we find that a
preference for home brands is the single most important driver of home market advantage -
even after controlling for brand histories and dealer networks. Furthermore, we also find that
consumers favor domestically producing brands even if these brands originated from a foreign
country. Therefore, our results suggest a novel demand effect of FDI: Establishing local produc-
tion increases demand for the brand even in the absence of any cost savings.
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1 Introduction
In tradable goods industries, it is typical for firms to earn their highest market shares in their
domestic market. This home market advantage persists despite substantial integration of interna-
tional markets over the past several decades. There is no shortage of explanations (e.g., trade costs,
investment frictions, home preference, taste heterogeneity for characteristics) for this empirical reg-
ularity, but different explanations have substantially different policy implications. The goal of this
paper is to quantify the sources of home market advantage, and to understand their implications
for international trade and investment. In particular, what are the roles of tariff and non-tariff
barriers, transportation costs, and foreign production costs in explaining global market outcomes?
How important are consumer preferences, either for particular characteristics or simply for national
brands? The automobile industry provides an interesting case for analyzing these questions. The
industry accounts for over 10 percent of world trade in manufactured goods (WTO, 2013) and
bears the features of many oligopolistic industries, producing differentiated and tradable goods,
while domestic producers command a dominant share in their home markets.
Apart from the auto industry’s importance in world trade and manufacturing employment, the
availability of data also makes this industry suitable for our analysis. We have compiled a rich and
unique dataset of global sales and supply. The sales data inform us about prices and quantities (as
opposed to revenue only) by automobile model, as well as several characteristics (e.g., horsepower,
size, weight and fuel efficiency) in nine countries across three continents. On the supply side,
we have worldwide data on the assembly plant locations of each model. We propose a structural
model that exploits two features of the data to separate preference-based incentives to purchase local
products from supply-side frictions such as trade and investment costs. First, the availability of
price data allows us to measure the willingness to pay for models. Second, the prevalence of foreign
direct investment (FDI) provides variation between national brand identity and assembly location
across models, helping to disentangle their demand and supply effects. Moreover, we are able
to separately identify country-level preferences for observed characteristics (such as heterogeneous
taste for fuel efficiency across countries) from home preference—a systemic preference for purchasing
local products. Such a preference could arise from several sources including consumer information
asymmetries between local and non-local products, nationalistic feelings, or a stronger ability on
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the part of local brands to respond to localized tastes for unobserved characteristics (e.g., body
styling or interior features such as cup holders).1
Traditionally, models of international trade have relied on relatively restrictive demand sys-
tems (e.g. constant elasticity of substitution in Krugman 1980, Eaton and Kortum 2002, Melitz
2003, and Anderson and van Wincoop 2003) to analyze market outcomes.2 While these approaches
represent tractable means of analysis, they may be limited in their ability to capture rich substitu-
tion patterns that are a feature of horizontally differentiated oligopolistic industries such as cars.
Quantitative applications have also been limited by the availability of only revenue data without
credible price and quantity information. As a result, they may lead to biased estimates of trade
costs and an underappreciation of preference differences across national markets. We incorporate
a random coefficients approach to estimate demand, allowing for both within- and across-market
heterogeneity in consumer preferences. This more flexible approach enables us to consistently es-
timate demand- and supply-driven mechanisms behind market segmentation.3 The model yields
estimates of product-specific markups, trade costs, and production costs from detailed industry
level data. This extends, in an industry equilibrium, the analysis of recent quantitative trade mod-
els with multinational production (Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare 2013; Arkolakis et al. 2013; and
Tintelnot 2017), which were also limited by the availability of only revenue data on multinationals’
foreign affiliate sales for the aggregate manufacturing sector.
Separating the underlying drivers of home market advantage is important for understanding
how globalization affects market outcomes and welfare. In the absence of preference-based drivers,
one would expect the home market advantage to vanish if all trade barriers were removed. Despite
large reductions in formal barriers to trade and foreign investment, as well as in transport and
communication costs, significant home market advantages persist. If this is to a large extent
accounted for by demand-related factors, the implications for policy and firm strategies are very
1In a world with trade costs and increasing returns to scale, local producers may obtain larger national market
shares for reasons distinct from home preference if they happen to supply the goods that are in high relative demand
in the home country (the home market effect in Krugman 1980). Auer (2014) applies this idea to the automotive
industry in order to rationalize the sluggish response of trade flows when trade costs fall.
2With the notable exception of non-homothetic preferences (Fieler 2011; Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman
2011; Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal 2014) which are used to rationalize a certain pattern in the trade data, namely
the prevalence of north-north trade. However, in that literature consumer preferences are identical across countries,
and it is income levels that vary.
3In previous work (Cos¸ar, Grieco and Tintelnot 2015), we estimated supply-side border frictions in wind turbine
trade using detailed geographic data on firm sales.
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different from models that only consider supply-side frictions. We find that demand-side differences
are significant drivers of home market advantage relative to supply side policy frictions. This limits
the extent to which trade liberalization can foster market integration; ignoring these limitations
would lead policy makers to over-emphasize the benefits of trade liberalization.
Our model builds on the random coefficients demand model developed by Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995). While we follow the general approach in estimating demand and cost side in that
workhorse model in the industrial organization literature, we make several departures from the
standard analysis. On the demand side, we recover a brand-market-specific shifter to consumers’
utilities that we decompose into a rich set of observables such as brand nationality, dealer density,
and brand entry date to each market. On the cost side, we build on the model of FDI and
export platforms by Tintelnot (2017) to solve a firm’s sourcing decision from its portfolio of plants.
In the data, firms tend to have multiple assembly plants that can produce their products, and
therefore a multi-plant model is necessary for the quantitative analysis of the supply side. We
use variation in assembly and headquarter locations to estimate trade and foreign production
costs, while accounting for firms’ endogenous sourcing decision across the set of available plants.
This allows us to directly recover the cost elasticities of various trade related observables such
as assembly-to-market distance and headquarter-to-assembly distance. To our knowledge, our
paper is the first to combine a random coefficients demand side model—to flexibly estimate a
rich set of market-specific demand elasticities—together with a multi-plant supply side model—to
estimate trade and multinational production frictions. Finally, we develop a procedure to unpack
the contributions of tariffs, trade/FDI costs, home preference, and taste heterogeneity in explaining
market shares.
To quantify home market advantage, we calculate the difference in market share when a model
is sold at home versus abroad, controlling for model and market fixed effects. Using our structural
estimates, we then evaluate the contributions of potential drivers of home market advantage by
computing counterfactual prices and shares after removing various demand and supply components
of our model and re-computing the home market advantage statistic. We find that home market
advantage is most sensitive to the removal of home preference for domestic brands, declining by
about 47 percent. In contrast, when we remove all tariffs, trade, and foreign production costs,
the home market advantage declines by only 19 percent. Importantly, our results are obtained by
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controlling for the impact of a brand’s entry date into a market, dealer density, and whether the
brand has any local assembly. Since, for historical reasons, these factors are correlated with home
status, treating them as unobserved would lead to even larger estimates of home preference. While
the trade literature has often used trade costs and home bias in preference interchangeably, one of
the key contributions of this paper is to disentangle the role of these two forces.4
In addition to the importance of home preference for brands, we also uncover a novel demand
impact of foreign production. Since brands typically assemble models in a variety of locations,
we are able to separate how local production of any model affects local taste for the brand from
the usual cost effect of local assembly for a particular model. We find this preference for brands
with domestic assembly plants, regardless brands’ country of origin, to be significant and roughly
two-thirds of the home preference effect. As such, the domestic assembly demand effect represents
an intriguing rationale for FDI beyond reducing trade costs.
A number of papers have looked at the car industry to study questions in trade. Among
them, Feenstra (1988), Goldberg (1995), and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) analyze the effects
of Japanese voluntary export restraints on the American auto market; Goldberg and Verboven
(2004) use panel data from the car industry to demonstrate a strong positive effect of the Euro on
price convergence; Brambilla (2007) investigates firms’ responses to trade policy in South America;
McCalman and Spearot (2013) study firms’ offshoring strategies using data on North American
light truck production locations; and Miravete, Moral and Thurk (2015) analyze the role of emission
policy as an entry barrier using Spanish car market data. In recent work, Barwick, Cao and Li
(2016) have documented the existence of local protectionist policies—such as brand specific tax
rebates—that distort the automobile market across Chinese provinces.
Closer to our work, Goldberg and Verboven (2001) study price dispersion in the European car
market and also find evidence that consumers favor national brands. Their paper, however, does not
quantify the importance of demand versus cost drivers for market segmentation. By analyzing data
beyond the European market and accounting for dealer networks and brand-market histories, we
bring in important variation, such as larger differences in gas prices, supply barriers, and potentially
4See for example the following quote from the gravity model review article by Anderson (2011): “It is usual
to impose identical preferences across countries. [. . . ] Henceforth trade cost is used without qualification but is
understood to potentially reflect demand-side home bias. Declines in trade costs can be understood as reflecting
homogenization of tastes.”
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also in preferences across the Atlantic.
In contemporaneous work, Head and Mayer (2016) estimate a model of international trade and
foreign production using sourcing data from the automotive industry, finding that foreign sales
are impeded significantly by trade, foreign production, and multinational sales frictions. Similar
to our paper, the latter captures a general disadvantage in selling outside the home market. Our
contribution is to disentangle the demand- and supply-related components of this disadvantage.5
Our findings are related to Atkin (2013) who demonstrates that neglecting taste heterogeneity
for food leads to biased estimates of gains from trade. They also complement an extensive literature
in marketing illustrating the importance of brand preferences (Bronnenberg, Dhar and Dube 2009;
Bronnenberg, Dube and Gentzkow 2012). Relative to these papers, we contribute by jointly analyz-
ing cost and preference differences across markets and quantifying their impact in an international
context. While previous work has documented that each of these channels is important, our work
is the first to directly compare the impact of tastes and costs on home market advantage.
The next section describes the data and presents the stylized facts motivating our analysis.
Section 3 formulates a model of international competition in the automobile market. We estimate
the model in Section 4 and evaluate the drivers of home market advantage in Section 5.
2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
Our dataset covers the market for passenger cars in 6 EU countries (Belgium, Germany, France,
Italy, Spain, Great Britain), Brazil, Canada and the US for the period 2007-2011.6 For each
available market-year, we observe model-level sales (i.e. number of new cars sold), prices (MSRP)
and product characteristics (such as length, width, weight, and fuel efficiency). The characteristics
of a model are the sales-weighted average trim-level characteristics and vary across markets and
years. We also constructed a dataset of assembly countries for each model-year in the demand
data. Complementing these datasets are market-specific variables such as gas prices, import tariffs
on cars, sales taxes, the level and dispersion of household income, as well as brand-market-specific
5While their dataset reports model level flows between all assembly locations and many more destination markets,
our dataset has more detailed information about the product—most notably, prices and characteristics—in fewer yet
important markets. Having information on prices and quantities separately is key in identifying demand- from
supply-related factors.
6Brazilian market data is missing for 2007, and Canadian data is available for 2008-2009 only. Total sales cover
more than 90% of total new passenger car sales in the European markets and 80% of sales in the American markets.
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Table 1: Market concentration
Number of Share of Number of Share of Number of Share of
Sales Firms Top 5 Brands Top 5 Models Top 5
BEL 496,171 20 0.68 39 0.44 314 0.13
BRA 2,635,547 17 0.82 24 0.81 101 0.36
CAN 1,137,750 16 0.65 34 0.50 207 0.22
DEU 3,011,988 20 0.71 38 0.54 323 0.18
ESP 1,082,868 21 0.72 39 0.44 290 0.16
FRA 2,046,077 20 0.81 38 0.65 271 0.25
GBR 2,026,497 22 0.63 39 0.47 311 0.21
ITA 2,016,114 22 0.70 41 0.51 283 0.26
USA 10,390,308 19 0.68 40 0.53 291 0.14
Notes: Average number of passenger cars sold annually in each country over the data period. Market
shares by top manufacturing groups (firms), brands and models are revenue-based.
variables such as a brand’s entry date into a market and the number of car dealers in the market.
Appendix A describes the construction of the dataset.
Some manufacturing groups own multiple brands. In what follows, we distinguish firms (manu-
facturing groups such as General Motors (GM) and Volkswagen (VW)), brands (such as Chevrolet,
Vauxhall, and Opel owned by GM; Audi and Seat owned by VW) and models (such as Chevrolet
Malibu and Opel Corsa). In cases where a firm owns foreign brands, we distinguish the headquarter
country from a brand’s nationality. For example, GM is a US firm, but Vauxhall and Opel are
British and German brands, respectively. In other words, a brand’s nationality is defined as the
country from which it historically originates. Accordingly, a brand enjoys home status in its coun-
try of origin (such as Opel in Germany). Across all years and markets, the dataset encompasses
28 firms, 60 brands and 598 models. Firms are headquartered in 12 different countries, and brands
are associated with 15 different countries.
We now document a number of facts that guide our modeling choices. The oligopolistic nature
of the car industry is well known. While measures of concentration vary across markets (Table 1),
sales-weighted average top-5 concentration ratios are 71% and 56% of total revenues for firms and
brands, respectively.
Table 2 presents market shares by brand nationality. The diagonal in bold highlights the
dominance of home brands (Belgium, Brazil and Canada do not have a national brand in our
dataset). Spanish and British brands have marginal sales outside of their markets. Similarly,
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Table 2: Market shares by brand nationality
Market share of brands from
DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA Other
BEL 0.34 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.23
BRA 0.23 - 0.11 0.00 0.22 0.31 0.13
CAN 0.07 - - 0.01 - 0.34 0.58
DEU 0.55 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.21
ESP 0.26 0.09 0.26 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.22
FRA 0.19 0.02 0.52 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.16
GBR 0.23 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.16 0.25
ITA 0.24 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.30 0.12 0.17
USA 0.08 - - 0.01 0.00 0.40 0.52
Notes: Each row presents the revenue-based market share of brands orig-
inating from countries listed in the columns, adding up to one subject to
rounding error. - means that brands from the origin country are not sold
in the market, and 0.00 implies a market share of less than one percent.
Other includes Japan, Korea, China, India, Sweden, Malaysia, Czech Re-
public, Romania and Russia.
Italian brands have low sales in other European markets but a stronger presence in Brazil due
to FDI by Fiat in South America. The most striking difference is between Germany and France:
in both markets, home brands account for more than half of the sales, whereas German brands’
market share in France is only 19%, which is relatively higher than the French market share of 9%
in Germany.
Brands’ differential market shares across countries are driven by an extensive margin of model
offerings as well as an intensive margin of sales per model. In order to decompose these two margins,
we follow Bernard et al. (2009) and start with the identity
sbmt = s¯bmt ·Nbmt,
where sbmt is the total share of brand b in market m sales in year t, s¯bmt is the average share
of brand b’s models in that market-year, and Nbmt is the number of models offered. We then
separately project ln(Nbmt) and ln(s¯bmt) on ln(sbmt). Table 3 reports the results. The intensive
margin accounts for 58 to 62 percent of the overall variation, depending on whether the market
share is in revenues or units sold. Variation in the popularity of brands across countries is not
simply due to the number of products offered.
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Table 3: Market share decomposition
I II III IV
ln(s¯bmt) ln(Nbmt) ln(s¯bmt) ln(Nbmt)
ln(sbmt) 0.618 0.382 0.577 0.423
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 1473 1473 1473 1473
R2 0.810 0.619 0.780 0.654
Share Units Units Revenue Revenue
Margin Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. This table shows the share of variation
in sbm coming from the intensive margin (average model market share of the
brand) and the extensive margin (number of models offered by the brand).
Accordingly, columns I and II as well as columns III and IV add up to one.
All regressions are estimated with year fixed effects.
To gauge the extent of the home market advantage, we project market shares on a dummy
variable that takes the value one if a model is at home and zero otherwise. Table 4 presents the
results. The first two columns are the brand-market-year (bmt) level, while the last column is at the
model-market-year (jmt) level. Given the importance of the extensive margin documented above,
column II also controls for the (log) number of models that the brand offers. Fixed effects control
for brands’ and models’ global popularity and market-year specific conditions. We find a large and
significant home market effect: being a home brand increases market share at the model level by
238 percent.7 We label this effect “home market advantage.”
The data also exhibits significant cross-country variation in product offerings and sales. Table
5 presents average prices and characteristics (weighted by sales) of cars sold in each market. The
average car in the North American market is larger in horsepower and size (columns 2 and 3)
and less fuel efficient (column 4) than the typical car sold in Europe and Brazil. Differences in
gas prices, however, affect the average cost of a mile (last column) that consumers face in each
market. While some of this variation is due to the extensive margin, characteristics also differ
within models. Controlling for model fixed effects, we see less powerful engines and much higher
fuel economy in European countries and Brazil compared to the North American market (see Table
B.3 in Appendix B.2). These systematic differences highlight the importance of controlling for
7We calculate home market advantage using 100 · (exp(cˆ)−1), where cˆ is the coefficient on the dummy for being a
home brand. If we follow Kennedy (1981) and van Garderen and Shah (2002), and calculate home market advantage
using 100 · (exp(cˆ− 1
2
V (cˆ))− 1), where V (cˆ) is the estimate of its variance, we obtain nearly identical results, since
the coefficient is very precisely estimated.
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Table 4: Home market advantage
I II III
ln(sbmt) ln(sbmt) ln(sjmt)
Home brand 1.679 1.066 1.219
(0.082) (0.061) (0.032)
ln(Nbmt) 1.533
(0.042)
Observations 1473 1473 8841
R2 0.793 0.895 0.720
Market-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Brand FE Yes Yes
Model FE Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are
estimated with market-year (mt) fixed effects. The first
two columns are at the brand-market-year (bmt) level and
use brand fixed effects. The last column is at the model-
market-year (jmt) and uses model fixed effects.
product characteristics when estimating consumer demand.
On the production side, there are 50 countries that assemble cars. 43% of the models (255 out
of 598) are assembled in more than one country, accounting for 64% of total revenue. The market
share of models assembled in 5 or more countries is 30% (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B.2). Our data
inform us about the set of countries in which each model is assembled, but we do not know exactly
which assembly plant was used to serve which market. Column 1 of Table 6 presents the average
number of countries in which models consumed in a particular market are assembled (weighted by
sales). For instance, there are 3.8 countries in which models sold in Brazil are assembled, while
models sold in Canada are assembled in 5 countries. Geography, units costs and trade policy are
important determinants of these potential supply locations. Brazil is the most protected country
in our dataset, with an MFN import tariff on cars equal to 35%, and the US is the most open, with
an MFN import tariff of 2.5%.8 (column 4). The resulting tariff-jumping FDI leads to a higher
market share for the models that are assembled domestically (column 3) in countries with high
tariffs. For example, the market share of models with domestic assembly plants is 86 percent in
8The so-called US “chicken tax” of 25% applies to light trucks (formally, “motor vehicles designed for the trans-
portation of goods”, HS 8704), which we exclude from our analysis. SUVs are imported as passenger cars (formally,
“motor vehicles designed for the transportation of passengers”, HS 8703). The classification of SUVs as passenger
vehicles was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals in Marubeni Am. Corp. vs. United States, 35 F.3d 530 (1994).
For a discussion of litigation on the “chicken tax” see Ikenson (2003).
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Table 5: Prices and characteristics
Price HP/Wt Size MPG Gas price MPD
BEL 27,078 58.4 7.6 34.4 5.2 6.6
BRA 13,808 62.1 6.8 30.1 2.1 14.4
CAN 24,301 91.9 8.3 22.2 2.9 7.7
DEU 30,981 66.8 7.6 29.3 5.9 4.9
ESP 26,143 60.8 7.6 32.6 4.7 7
FRA 25,161 57.2 7.3 35.5 5.3 6.7
GBR 28,859 65.5 7.5 30.4 5.5 5.6
ITA 24,252 57.6 7 33.4 5.3 6.4
USA 26,363 97.9 8.7 20.8 2.5 8.3
Notes: All variables are averages across models weighted by market share
over the data period. Prices are deflated to their 2005 local currency lev-
els and converted to USD at that year’s exchange rate. HP/Wt denotes
horsepower per weight (kg) times 1,000. Size is meter length times me-
ter width. MPG is miles per gallon. Gas prices are per gallon in 2005
USD. MPD is miles per dollar (MPG/price). Appendix A describes data
sources and tabulation procedures.
Brazil. There is also substantial variation across markets in the distance to the nearest assembly
plant.9
To gain some initial insight into how model characteristics and supply locations correlate with
prices, Table 7 presents the results of hedonic price regressions with various fixed effects. Both
columns control for model and market-year fixed effects. In addition, the second column includes
class (small car, large car, SUV) by year fixed effects to control for the potential effects of the 2008
financial crisis. While these regressions are unable to distinguish demand and supply effects from
each other, they do give an indication of how equilibrium prices move with model characteristics. As
expected, horsepower per weight, size and fuel efficiency are all associated with higher prices. The
coefficient on distance to nearest assembly is also positive and significant. Under the assumption
that consumers do not care about distance to assembly after controlling for other factors, this result
implies that assembly distance has some power as an instrument for demand. Most interestingly, a
model being assembled at home is negatively correlated with price, while a model being associated
with a home brand is positively correlated with price.10 These two features can be separated due
9 The distances in Table 6 include internal distance within a country. We use bilateral and internal distances from
the CEPII data (Mayer and Zignago 2011) calculated as population-weighted distances between the biggest cities of
two countries. Internal distances range from 66 km in Belgium to 1,853 km in the U.S.
10As is well known, the MSRP can differ from the actual transaction price. In Appendix B.1, we analyze online
car sales from three countries. We document that while brands differ in the extent to which they give discounts on
MSRP, they do not give systematically larger discounts at home than they do abroad.
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Table 6: Supply locations
Supply Average Domestic MFN
Locations Distance Share (%) Tariff (%)
BEL 4.4 1095 9 10
BRA 3.8 1897 86 35
CAN 5 3669 26 6.1
DEU 4.7 1077 51 10
ESP 4.5 1627 33 10
FRA 4.2 1027 41 10
GBR 4.5 1440 17 10
ITA 4 1333 20 10
USA 4.2 3625 54 2.5
Notes: All figures weighted by market share. Supply location is
the average number of countries in which models sold in a mar-
ket are assembled, weighted by models’ market share. Average
distance is the average distance across models to the closest sup-
ply location including internal distance, see footnote 9. Domestic
share is the market share of models which have an assembly plant
in the country. Implied internal distances capture differences in
land area across countries. MFN (most favored nation) is the non-
discriminatory tariff rate applied to WTO members that are not
in a free trade agreement with the country.
to FDI: some home brands’ models are produced abroad and imported while some foreign brands’
models are assembled within the market. This finding supports our assumption in the structural
model below that brand nationality affects the demand for cars, while car models’ assembly location
affects their production costs.
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Table 7: Price regression
ln(pricejmt) ln(pricejmt)
ln(hppwtjmt) 0.267 0.246
(0.011) (0.012)
ln(sizejmt) 0.544 0.494
(0.039) (0.043)
ln(mpdjmt) 0.029 0.038
(0.010) (0.010)
ln(distjmt) 0.019 0.018
(0.002) (0.002)
Domestic assembly by model -0.013 -0.010
(0.004) (0.004)
Domestic assembly by brand -0.007 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003)
Home brand 0.023 0.017
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 8841 8841
R2 0.985 0.988
Market-year FE Yes Yes
Model FE Yes Yes
Class-year FE Yes
Notes: See table 5 for the description of parameters. Home brand is one
if a model belongs to a national brand and zero otherwise. Domestic as-
sembly by model is one if there is an assembly plant for a model in the
country and zero otherwise. Domestic assembly by brand is one if there is
at least one model owned by the same brand and assembled in the coun-
try, and zero otherwise. Regressions control for market-year fixed effects,
model fixed effects and class (small, large, SUV) by year fixed effects.
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3 Model
We model the national market for cars in a given year. We first give a brief overview of the model
describing the assumptions on the timing of actions. We then discuss demand and supply in more
detail in the subsections below.
Firms (e.g., Toyota) are endowed with a set of brands (e.g., Toyota, Lexus) which in turn are
endowed with a set of models (e.g., Toyota Corolla, Toyota Camry) to sell within the market. We
take as given the headquarter location of a firm and the country of origin of a brand. Each model is
endowed with a set of characteristics (e.g., size, fuel efficiency) and a set of assembly locations where
the model can be produced. At the start of the year, all firms observe a set of demand and supply
shocks for each model that are uncorrelated with model or assembly location characteristics. This
implies that a firm chooses to offer a car in a location before observing the model-market demand or
supply shock. This assumption—common to many random coefficients demand estimations (e.g.,
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995)—is reasonable in our context because while it is relatively easy
to adjust a car’s price in reaction to local market conditions, the decision to release a model in
a country generally involves a significant period of design and marketing research prior to entry.
Similarly, moving the assembly of a certain model to a plant requires a planning and retooling
time. Having observed their own and competitors’ demand and supply shocks, firms simultaneously
choose prices at the model level according to a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium – taking into account
cannibalization across brands within the firm. We follow the literature on automobile pricing in
assuming that prices are set at the model level and consumers face a single price. Consumers then
observe these prices and make purchases. Finally, automakers select the assembly location from
which to source ordered cars. We allow for heterogeneity in production costs at the car-assembly
location level so that a firm may choose to source cars from multiple assembly locations to supply
the same model to a market. In addition to allowing for potential gains to variety in assembly
locations, this cost heterogeneity in individual orders makes the model computationally tractable
to estimate.
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3.1 Demand
The utility to consumer i in market m from purchasing model j is,11
ujmi = u¯(xjm, pjm, βmi, αmi) + ξjm + εjmi (1)
where xjm represents the model characteristics—e.g. horsepower per weight, size, fuel efficiency
—and pjm represents the price. Importantly, brand-country fixed effects are also included in xjm.
These capture everything that varies at the brand-country level such as dealer networks, the year of
a brand’s first entry in a market, or whether the brand first originated from that country. We assume
that consumers are indifferent between the assembly locations for a particular model, hence the
assembly location used to serve model j to market m does not enter xjm.
12 Consumers are, however,
allowed to have different preferences for brands that have local production (for example, consumers
may prefer to support local manufacturing employment). The terms βmi and αmi represent tastes
for characteristics and price sensitivity, respectively. Differences in βmi across individuals and
countries may arise due to innate preferences or differences in the prices of complementary goods
such as parking space and gasoline. Each model receives a market-year-specific demand shock, ξjm,
which is common to all consumers within a market. Finally, each consumer receives an idiosyncratic
utility shock for each model, εjmi, which is distributed according to the Type-I extreme value
distribution.
Consumers in each market observe the set of available products and choose the model that
maximizes their utility from all available models and a no-purchase option. We normalize the
utility of the no-purchase option to u0mi = ε0mi and let Cm be the set of cars consumers can choose
from within market m. Each consumer chooses the option that maximizes her utility,
dmi = argmax
j∈Cm∪0
ujmi.
Integrating out the idiosyncratic consumer taste shock, the probability that a consumer with tastes
11For readability we omit the time subscript, t, from the model section.
12This assumption is reasonable because if consumers indeed cared about the assembly location of a particular
model, manufacturers should offer different MSRPs for the same model produced in different locations, which we
don’t observe in the markets that we study.
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(βmi, αmi) buys model j is,
Pr(dmi = j|βmi, αmi) = e
u¯jmi+ξjm
1 +
∑
k∈Cm e
u¯kmi+ξkm
.
Market share for model j then can be calculated by integrating these individual-specific probabilities
over the distribution of consumer tastes in the market:
sjm =
∫
Pr(dmi = j|βmi, αmi)dFm(βmi, αmi|θd), (2)
where the vector of demand parameters, θd, governs the distribution of tastes.
3.2 Supply
Firms supply models to consumers by sourcing them from available assembly locations, which were
determined prior to demand and cost shocks being revealed to the firms. The marginal cost of
sourcing a car i of model type j for market m from location ` is,
cjm`i = c1(hjm, κ)c2(gjm`, δ)e
ωjm−νjm`i (3)
where c1(·) represents model- and market-specific costs of selling model j in market m, which
are determined by a vector of observable model and market characteristics hjm (such as global
production costs of the vehicle and local distribution costs) and a vector of parameters κ. Similarly,
c2(·) represents the effect of costs due to sourcing model j from an assembly plant in location `
to be sold in market m. It depends on a vector of known market-assembly-model characteristics
gjm` (such as distance to the sourcing country from the market and the firm’s headquarter location
and productivity in the assembly location) and a vector of parameters δ. The structural error
term ωjm represents a shock to the marginal costs of selling model j in a given market m. Finally,
costs at the car level are affected by an idiosyncratic shock, νjm`i. This final cost is revealed to
the manufacturer at the time a car is ordered, after prices for models are set. Producers have full
knowledge of ωjm and all other cost shifters besides νjm`i when setting prices. As we show below,
the idiosyncratic error νjm`i introduces the possibility of “gains from diversification” in assembly
locations and rationalizes the possibility that some models are sourced from multiple assembly
16
locations.
The manufacturer minimizes costs by sourcing cars from the lowest cost location from its set
of available assembly locations, L(j),
cjmi = min
`∈L(j)
cjm`i.
However, the firm must set prices prior to the νjm`i shock being revealed; therefore it must set
prices according to its expected cost of supplying a model by integrating over νjm`i. We assume
νjm`i is distributed Type-I extreme value with scale parameter σν .
13 Given this assumption, the
probability of sourcing a car to market m from location ` is,
Pr
[
i of model j is sourced to market m from ` ∈ L(j)] = c2(gjm`, δ)−1/σν∑
k∈L(j) c2(gjmk, δ)−1/σν
, (4)
where we exploit the fact that minimizing cost is equivalent to maximizing the negative of the
logarithm of cost. Therefore, the logarithm of the average marginal cost to sell a car of model j
is,14
log cjm = log c1(hjm, κ)− σν log
 ∑
k∈L(j)
exp
(− log c2(gjmk, δ)
σν
)+ ωjm. (5)
Or equivalently, the average marginal cost for model j in market m is,
cjm = c1(hjm, κ)
 ∑
k∈L(j)
c2(gjmk, δ)
−1/σν
−σν exp(ωjm). (6)
In these expressions, the second term captures the fact that manufacturers endogenously choose
to source cars from the lowest cost locations. The intuition behind this formula is straightforward.
Lower cost locations are more likely to be used as sources, which is reflected in the fact that they
contribute the most to the sum over locations. Moreover, as more locations are added, this sum
increases, further reducing costs. The expression for costs is computationally tractable, since it is
13We could relax the assumption that νjm`i is independent across i at the cost of additional notation. For example,
we could divide the year into a large number of discrete time sub-periods and let each consumer who purchases a car
within a sub-period receive the same draw of νjm`i. This would be consistent with the shock reflecting unanticipated
backlogs or shocks to assembly location productivity during the year.
14A constant from integrating the Type-I extreme value distribution is absorbed in log c1(hjm, κ).
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differentiable in all parameters. The value of σν captures “gains from variety” in the sense that
the value of an additional assembly location is scaled by σν . Furthermore, as σν → 0, firms always
source from the single location that has the lowest average cost, and equation (5) becomes,
lim
σν→0
log cjm = log c1(hjm, κ) + min
k∈L(j)
{
log c2(gjmk, δ)
}
+ ωjm.
So as σν → 0, only variation in gjmk at the minimum cost location affects the marginal cost of a
model. However, in the limit as σν → 0, average costs are no longer differentiable with respect
to the source-destination-specific cost parameters.15 The supply-side parameters to estimate are
θs = (δ, κ, σν).
3.3 Pricing Equilibrium
Firms choose prices to maximize profits given demand and the average marginal cost of a model
cjmt, which is determined by the cost minimization across available assembly locations as described
above. Since a mass of consumers purchases cars, cjmt is exactly known to firms when they set
prices, even though they do not know νjm`i until consumer i purchases a car. For the same reason,
firms know from (2) exactly what the shares will be given a vector of prices within the market
pm. Therefore, firm f ’s profit maximization problem is to choose prices for its portfolio of models
within a market Jm(f) to maximize profits,
16
max
{pjm}j∈Jm(f)
∑
j∈Jm(f)
[
pjm − cjm
] ·Nm · sjm(pjm; p−jm ), (7)
where Nm is the exogenous number of potential buyers and p
−j
m is the vector of prices for models
other than j. A Nash-Bertrand equilibrium strategy profile is a vector pm such that sjm = sjm(pm)
and all firms are maximizing profits. Therefore, prices satisfy the system of first order conditions
for every price, pjm.
15In fact, in our application we find that σν is close to zero, so this cost draw primarily plays a technical role in
convexifying the firms’ sourcing problem.
16We control for differences in tax regimes (e.g., value added versus retail sales tax) across markets using country
market dummies in the specification of costs. The model could be extended to explicitly account for differing tax
regimes given stronger assumptions about how the base amount for these regimes is determined.
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sjm(pm) +
∑
k∈Jm(f)
[
pkm − ckm
]∂skm(pm)
∂pjm
= 0. (8)
3.4 Identification
Before turning to estimation, we discuss how the parameters of our model are identified, with
a particular focus on the identification of the cost-side parameters. As we show below, these
parameters are identified even though we do not directly observe the source-destination-specific
trade flows of cars. Identification of the demand-side parameters is relatively standard: the demand
parameters are identified via moment condition assumptions on the model-market demand shocks
ξjm. As shown by Berry (1994), there is a one-to-one mapping between the demand shocks and
observed market shares given demand parameters and observed prices. So, given a vector of demand
parameters θd, we can numerically recover the complete vector of demand shocks within a market,
ξjm = s
−1
j (sm, pm; θ
d).
We then identify the model using a vector of instruments zjm such that E[ξjmzjm] = 0.
17 The
model precludes price from being used as an instrument since it is endogenously determined.
With the demand parameters identified, we are able to recover marginal cost for each model
by inverting the firms’ first order conditions at observed prices and shares as in Nevo (2001). For
clarity, we suppress the market subscripts and focus on a single market. Given demand parameters
and observed prices and shares, all the terms in (8) are known with the exception of the vector of
marginal costs cm. Note that firms internalize their cross-price effect on other models that they
sell, but not on competitor models. If we define Ω such that,
Ωjk = −∂sk(pm)
∂pj
· 1[j, k jointly owned],
then we can write (8) in vector notation, s(pm)−Ω(pm − cm) = 0, and we can easily solve this for
the vector of marginal costs,
cm = [pm − Ω−1s(pm)].
17We discuss the demand instruments we use in estimation in Section 4.1.
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Once costs are recovered, we can identify the cost-side parameter θs from (5) and the assump-
tion that E[ωjm|(hjm, gjm`)] = 0. While identification of model- and market-specific costs, κ,
is straightforward given regularity conditions that will be satisfied by our parameterization, the
contribution of trade- and location-specific production costs, parameterized by δ and σν , is more
subtle.18 First, consider identification of σν , the variance of the idiosyncratic car cost shock. Sup-
pose that all assembly locations were identical and geography was symmetric, that is, for a given
model, c2(gjm`, δ) = c¯2. In this case, the only reason to source from a particular location would
be due to the extreme value error, νjm`i. There would be a cost advantage to operating multiple
assembly locations in that the manufacturer would get a new draw of this idiosyncratic cost shock
for each location. Therefore, the extent to which marginal costs decline as we vary the number of
production locations identifies σν . In the extreme, suppose σν = 0. Then, an additional assembly
location will not reduce marginal costs at all. With σν identified, we can identify the parame-
ters on assembly location characteristics from the variation in these characteristics. This variation
will affect average costs in two ways. First, it will change the cost associated with that assembly
location conditional on it being used, and second, it will change the probability that the plant
is used to source cars. Again, consider the extreme case when σν = 0. Then, only variation in
the lowest cost assembly location’s characteristics affect average costs. Therefore, variation in an
assembly characteristic across locations first identifies which is the lowest cost and then identifies
the parameter for that characteristic based on the size of the change in cost. If σν is positive, then
variation in characteristics of all assembly locations affect costs, but its impact is weighted by the
quantity of cars each location provides. In summary, each element of δ is identified as long as it
affects c2(gjm`, δ) for some model j where trade flows are positive between market m and assembly
location `. This is the case even though we do not directly observe trade flows because we can use
variation in model costs cjm and gjm` to infer the effect of δ.
4 Estimation
The model is estimated in two stages. We first estimate the demand side, and use firms’ profit
maximization conditions and the estimated demand parameters to recover the marginal cost of
18We are assuming a location normalization in c2(gjmk, δ), as is common in discrete choice models, without loss
of generality. A scale normalization on σν is not necessary as we explain below.
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supplying each model to each country. We then use these recovered costs to estimate the supply
side.19 Since we use data from multiple years, we re-introduce the time subscript, t.
4.1 Demand Parameterization and Estimation
We start by parameterizing the utility function to be quasi-linear in price and car characteristics,
and quadratic in tastes for size:
u¯(xjmt, pjmt, βmi, αmti) = β
hp
mi hppwtjmt + β
md
mi mpdjmt + β
sz
mi sizejmt + β
sz2
m size
2
jmt (9)
− αmti pjmt + ιmti + ψmb(j),
where hppwtjmt is the horsepower of the car divided by its weight (a measure of acceleration
capability), sizejmt is the size of the car (length times width in meters), and mpdjmt is miles per
dollar at market price for gas (according to city fuel efficiency rating). This specification allows
for consumers’ marginal taste for size to increase or decrease in the amount of the characteristic
provided. We would expect the marginal utility of size to decrease as a car gets larger.
We allow tastes for characteristics to vary by country. First, we assume that the tastes for
hppwtjmt and sizejmt are normally distributed with country-specific means and common variance,
20
 βhpmi
βszmi
 ∼ N

 β¯hpm
β¯szm
 ,
 σ2hp 0
0 σ2sz

 ,
while the quadratic parameter for size is market-specific but constant across consumers within a
market.21
Second, we allow consumers preferences for miles – a proxy for cost of ownership – to be income
19In principle, demand and supply can be estimated jointly, which would improve efficiency at the cost of compu-
tational tractability.
20In principle we could allow the variances to vary by market, however because they enter the objective function
in a nonlinear way, doing so would greatly increase the computational complexity of estimation. Moreover, since
we have a maximum of five years of data from each market, it is not clear that these parameters could be precisely
estimated at the market level.
21This specification leads to the intuitive interpretation that a model with sizejmt provides a marginal utility for
size to the median consumer within market m as given by
med
(
∂ujmti
∂sizejmt
)
= β¯szm + 2β
sz2
m sizejmt,
while other consumers’ marginal utility for size is normally distributed around this level with variance σ2sz.
21
dependent. Because we do not observe individual consumers, we simulate their income, incmti,
from a log normal distribution fitted to mean household income and the Gini ratio for each market,
which we take from the Penn World Tables and the World Bank. Specifically, consumers tastes for
miles per dollar are also normally distributed according to,
βmdmti ∼ N(β¯mdm + pimd log incmti, σ2md).
Third, consumers’ price-sensitivity, αmti, is distributed log-normally conditional on consumer
i’s income according to,
logαmti ∼ N(α¯+ piα log incmti, σ2α).
Letting price sensitivity vary with income allows for non-homotheticity of preferences across mod-
els.22
Fourth, we allow for consumers’ tastes for purchasing automobiles to be heterogeneous across
consumers with a mean that depends on the country and year to capture shocks to automobile
demand,
ιmti ∼ N(ι¯mt, σ2ι ).
The final term ψmb(j) in (9) is a brand-country fixed effect, capturing revealed preference for
different brands within each country.23 For each model j, b(j) represents its brand. The same firm
may operate multiple brands. That is, the Toyota Corolla is of brand ‘Toyota’ while the Lexus
RX 450 is of brand ‘Lexus’ even though they are offered by the same firm (Toyota). Separating
brands within firms is important since firms frequently use branding as a method of accentuating
product differentiation. To the extent that consumers exhibit a preference for their home brands,
this preference is absorbed into these brand-country fixed effects.
Under this parameterization of the demand model, θd = (β¯xm, β
sz2
m , σx, pi
md, α¯, piα, σα, σι, ι¯mt, ψmb)
represents the parameters to estimate, where x ∈ {hp, sz,md}. As discussed above, given θd and
the observed market shares, there is a one-to-one mapping to the vector of demand shocks ξ(θd).
22We have experimented with allowing the taste for cars relative to the outside good to vary with income, but this
leads to imprecise estimates of that additional parameter and piα. Note that we include country-year fixed effects
which account for cross-country non-homotheticity.
23As a robustness check, we have also estimated a specification with model fixed effects that are constant across
countries.
22
We approximate the market shares using Halton sequences to integrate out the distribution of con-
sumer taste, and we solve this mapping numerically to recover the demand shocks implied by the
data for a given parameter values. We estimate the model by minimizing the generalized method
of moments objective function,
θˆd = argmin
θd
ξ(θd)′ZWˆZ ′ξ(θd),
where Z is a matrix of instruments and Wˆ is a consistent estimate of the optimal weight matrix
obtained from a first stage estimate.
To identify the price-sensitivity and other nonlinear parameters (eight in all), we employ three
types of instruments. First, we make use of the sums of the characteristics of other products in
the market—the so-called “BLP” instruments used in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) which
include the number of rival products in the market and the sum of the characteristics of rival prod-
ucts (horsepower per weight, size, and miles per dollar), yielding four instruments total. Second,
we make use of the “differentiation IVs” advocated recently by Gandhi and Houde (2016). For
each characteristic, we use two measures of the number of rival products in the vicinity a product,
providing six additional instruments.24 Finally, we leverage the assembly information in our data
to use cost shifters as instruments. We use the distance to and the tariff rate on the model’s near-
est assembly location, the model’s total number of assembly locations, and a dummy for domestic
assembly location for the model.25 This provides us with four cost side instruments, giving us 14
instruments total. Hence the model is over-identified. We have run several alternative specifica-
tions and have found that the results—in particular our measures of home preference and relative
elasticities and markups—are qualitatively robust. In particular, dropping the differentiation IVs
from the set of moment conditions results in lower demand elasticities and somewhat higher levels
of markups, but doesn’t affect our qualitative results regarding home market advantage.26
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4.2 Demand Estimates
The demand estimates are presented in Table 8. Estimates of the tastes for characteristics are
listed by country across columns at the top of table, with estimates of the standard deviation of
the linear coefficients and income effects in the last two columns. Estimates of price sensitivity are
provided at the bottom of the table. The price sensitivity parameters are all strongly significant
and indicate that price sensitivity decreases in income (piα < 0). We also find that the taste for
miles per dollars decreases with income (pimd < 0), consistent with low income consumers being
more concerned with the cost of ownership of the vehicle.
Considering the tastes for characteristics, we find evidence that the tastes for product char-
acteristics differ across countries, conditional on income. The estimated mean taste coefficients
for horse power per weight, size, and miles per dollar are remarkably similar across Canada and
the US, and quite different from the other countries. Since product characteristics are correlated
with each other and they are subject to technological constraints, the estimated taste coefficients
for characteristics are a bit difficult to interpret. Most countries tend to have positive taste for
horse power per weight, while the taste for this characteristic is negative in the US and Canada.
American and Canadian consumers tend to have lower taste for fuel efficiency than consumers in
Germany and Great Britain. The taste for size is concave for six out of nine countries, with a
significant coefficient on the quadratic term in four countries. As shown in Appendix Table B.4,
when evaluated at market-specific average, marginal utility for size to the median consumer is
comparable across markets.
The brand-country effects estimated in this step, ψmb, capture revealed tastes for particular
brands within country m. These will include consumers’ valuation of home brand status, as well
as the unobserved quality of the brand (such as reliability), its marketing cachet, the availability
of dealerships and repair shops for the brand, et cetera. To assess the strength of home preference,
we project the brand-market fixed effects on home status, a series of brand-market level controls,
as well as brand and market fixed effects. Specifically, we follow Chamberlain (1982) and (Nevo,
24Specifically, for each model j we count the number of competing models k such that difference in characteristics,
|xj − xk|, is within 0.1 and 1 standard deviations of the unconditional distribution of characteristic differences. This
statistic provides a measure of “local” competition in product space. See Gandhi and Houde (2016) for more details.
25Note that domestic assembly at the model level is not perfectly correlated with domestic assembly at the brand
level, and is more likely to affect the cost of a particular model than the brand reputation of the model.
26These results are available from the authors upon request.
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2001, 322-323) to estimate,
ψ̂mb = ρ1 · 1[b is a home brand in m] + ρ2 · 1[b assembles in m] + ηXmb + µb + µm + umb, (10)
where ρ1 represents the preference for brands that originated at home and ρ2 represents the pref-
erence for brands that have an assembly plant in the country, regardless of their origin. In our
data, almost all home brands have domestic assembly while only some multinationals assemble in
foreign markets, such as Toyota in the US.27 The controls, Xmb, account for brand-market charac-
teristics that are likely to be correlated with home status. We include in Xmb the number of years
that brands have been selling in each country prior to the start of our data, and the number of
dealerships per household.28 These variables capture various aspects of market penetration such as
cumulative advertising, number of experienced mechanics, and the convenience for the consumer.
Finally, we include a full set of market and brand fixed effects. The brand fixed effects absorb the
global appeal of a brand. We refer to the first parameter of interest, ρ1, as home preference; it
is the revealed preference for buying home brands, after controlling for observable characteristics
of offerings, overall brand quality, and the brand history and dealer network in a market. This
preference may have several sources, including the ability of home brands to provide unobserved
characteristics that better fit their home market, consumers’ nationalistic feelings for domestic
brands, or consumers’ stronger familiarity with domestic brands. We refer to the second parameter
of interest, ρ2, as domestic assembly preference. It captures consumers’ potential support for local
jobs and their perception of a brands’ long term commitment to supply their market.
The parameters in (10) can be consistently estimated if umb is uncorrelated with the right hand
side variables. There are two major concerns one might have about this exogeneity assumption.29
First, whether or not to have assembly plants and dealer networks were decisions endogenously
made by the brand at some point in time. It is difficult to find valid instruments to control for
this endogeneity explicitly. Many brands, however, first started producing in foreign countries and
27The single exception in our data to the rule that home brands have a domestic assembly plant is Smart. It is a
German brand but is assembled completely outside Germany.
28While the number of dealerships changes slightly from year to year, it is highly persistent, so we fix it over time
in our data and rely on cross-brand variation. See the data description in Appendix A for details.
29Note that even if this assumption does not hold, the estimates of brand preferences, elasticities and markups
will still be consistent under our timing assumptions since they rely on moment conditions in ξjmt rather than umb.
Furthermore, the estimation of the cost parameters below will be unaffected.
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Table 9: Estimates for home brand and domestic assembly statuses
I II III IV V
ψ̂mb ψ̂mb ψ̂mb ψ̂mb ψ̂mb
Home brand, ρ1 1.138 0.776 0.662 0.598 0.513
(0.074) (0.093) (0.095) (0.097) (0.099)
Domestic assembly, ρ2 0.465 0.477 0.382 0.396
(0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.064)
Years in market 0.004 0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
Dealer density 0.121 0.116
(0.020) (0.020)
Brand FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable ψ̂mb is the estimated brand-market fixed effects. Home
brand is one if brand b originates from market m and zero otherwise. Domestic
assembly is one if brand b has an assembly plant in market m and zero otherwise.
Years in market is the number of years that brand b has been selling in market m
as of 2011. Dealer density is number of dealers per household as of 2015. Home
preference assumed to be homogeneous across countries. Weighted bootstrap stan-
dard errors in parenthesis.
established dealer distribution networks a number of decades ago. Therefore, the current brand-
country-specific demand shock, umb, is not likely to be strongly correlated with these past decisions
For instance, Toyota has been selling in the US market since 1958 and established production in 1986
in response to Japanese voluntary export restraints; similarly, Ford has been exporting to Germany
since 1907 and established production in 1926 in response to tariff barriers. More systematically,
among all 113 brand-country combinations with local production in our data, the median year of
establishing local production is 1963 and the 75th percentile is 1990. Nevertheless, this may lead
our estimates of the taste for domestic assembly ρ2 and the taste for dealer density to be overstated,
if those activities are exercised more when the brand-country-specific demand shock, umb, is high.
By the same logic, this would bias home preference, ρ1, downward. Despite this possible downward
bias, we find—as we discuss below—that the taste for home origin is large. Second, brands that
originated at home or that have domestic assembly may also have higher advertising expenditures.
We have tried to obtain such data, but it was impossible to get this information for all brands in all
markets. However, advertising expenditure is presumably highly correlated with dealer networks
and years in market, which we include in the specification as controls.
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Table 10: Country-specific estimates
Home Domestic
Brand (ρ1) Assembly (ρ2)
BRA -0.186
(0.572)
BEL 0.220
(0.146)
CAN 0.199
(0.194)
DEU 0.441 -0.194
(0.263) (0.291)
ESP 1.032 0.360
(0.462) (0.168)
FRA 0.853 0.364
(0.226) (0.189)
GBR 0.250 0.463
(0.338) (0.174)
ITA 0.945 0.320
(0.351) (0.271)
USA 0.316 0.701
(0.181) (0.163)
Notes: This table presents results for a speci-
fication in which home preference, ρ1, and the
taste for brands with domestic assembly, ρ2, are
heterogeneous across countries. Weighted boot-
strap standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9 presents our estimates of the drivers of brand preference by varying the set of controls.
Across all specifications, the home preference estimate is substantial and highly significant. The
impact of history and dealer density attenuates the estimate of home preference by up to 35 percent,
suggesting that the head start of national brands plays an important role in their dominance.30
For our preferred specification with all controls in column V, the median consumer’s willingness to
pay for a home brand over a foreign one with domestic assembly is about $600 in the US (if all
other brand and model characteristics were identical). Relative to a foreign brand with no domestic
assembly, the median US consumer is willing to pay about $1,050 more for a home brand. This
corresponds to roughly 4 percent of the average car price in the US. The willingness to pay numbers
vary slightly across countries due to differences in the income distribution.
30This result is robust to alternative specification of market-brand characteristics, such as rank of entry (rather
than years in market) and including controls in logarithms (as opposed to levels).
28
To investigate how home preference varies across countries, we also estimate the model allowing
home preference, ρ1, and taste for domestic assembly, ρ2, to be interacted with market country.
The results, presented in Table 10, show that the home preference is not driven by outlier countries.
Because most countries have relatively few home brands, these estimates are less precise, although
most estimates remain statistically significant. However, there is some heterogeneity in home
preference across countries. We find it to be highest in Spain, France, and Italy. These results
are consistent with the findings of Goldberg and Verboven (2001) who find a strong preference for
domestic brands in European car markets between 1980-1993. The taste for domestic assembly is
strongest in the United States and Great Britain, and insignificant in a number of countries.
We finish this subsection by discussing possible drivers of home preference and of preference for
locally producing brands. Consumers may have an innate preference for purchasing local brands
arising out of nationalistic feelings. For example, Germans may prefer Volkswagen because they
view it as a German brand, while Italians might derive extra utility from purchasing a Fiat. Con-
sumers may prefer locally producing brands due to a desire to support local employment or because
they show a larger commitment to supply products and components also in the future in the lo-
cal market. Home preference may also be capturing systematic differences in unobserved product
characteristics (such as cup holders) for which tastes across countries differ. If home brands are
better in supplying these characteristics, our estimate of home preference will reflect those as well.
One may view the ability of local brands to quickly adjust to innovations in local preferences as
a potentially important aspect of home preference. That said, the results documented in Tables
B.2-B.3 of Appendix B.2 demonstrate that firms substantially customize their observed product
characteristics across markets—not only in terms of the sales-weighted averages but even within
the same model. Hence if cup holders are in higher demand in the US than in Europe, it is in the
best interest of foreign brands to react and supply them to the US market. To the extent that
they adjust these unobserved features in the same direction as home brands—as they seem to be
doing for observed characteristics—it is unlikely that long-run differences in unobserved product
characteristics will be the major driver of our estimate of ρ1. In Appendix B.5, we further explore
the importance of the match between national brands’ supply of and consumers’ demand for char-
acteristics by re-estimating the model restricting preferences for observed characteristics to be the
same across countries. If the match is important, one would expect the home preference resulting
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from this same-taste specification to be substantially larger. We do not find this to be the case,
which is consistent with the observation that even foreign brands have largely customized their
characteristics bundles to local tastes.
4.3 Markups
The demand parameters directly imply elasticities and markups for each model. We provide the
implied own and cross elasticities for selected models in Appendix Table B.5. In general, the model
predicts plausible own and cross elasticity patterns, with models of similar classes competing against
each other more strongly. We use the the estimates of elasticities to compute markups for each
model according to the firm’s first order condition (8). Appendix Table B.6 presents the median
(across years) of the implied markups for a selection of models. We find that markups range between
roughly 6 percent to 13, with the United States having relatively high markups, and Brazil having
relatively low markups.31 Comparing our results to the literature, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1995) estimate markups of around 20 percent in the US (page 882) using data from 1971-1990.
Goldberg and Verboven (2001) report markups varying from 17 percent (UK) to 33 percent (Italy)
in Europe using data from 1980-1993. A decline in markups from these earlier periods to our data
period (late 2000s) is quite plausible given the drastic changes in the automotive industry.
However, our interest is not so much on the average level of markups as the relationship be-
tween markups of home versus and foreign brands. To illustrate the impact of home preference
on markups, Table 11 displays the share-weighted average markup of the six major manufacturing
firms across all countries in our sales data. Across the table, we see that firms tend to charge their
Table 11: Weighted average markups of firms across markets (percent)
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
Fiat 7.6 8.5 9.2 7.2 9.5 8.4 11.8 7.4
Ford 6.3 8.5 9.0 8.4 7.5 9.2 9.4 8.5 10.0
GM 6.6 8.9 9.5 8.6 7.6 9.4 9.3 8.7 11.3
PSA 6.0 9.7 8.4 8.2 12.4 8.7 8.7
Toyota 6.1 8.2 9.9 8.1 7.0 8.9 8.1 8.2 9.6
VW 7.5 9.7 8.5 10.8 8.6 9.8 9.5 8.6 9.2
31As a basis for comparison, GM reported that it achieved an average margin of 10.3 percent for North American
operations in 2015, and states that part of its strategic plan is to maintain margins “between 9 and 10 percent”
(General Motors, 2016). Of course, comparing accounting-based margins to our estimates of margins based on
pricing and estimated elasticities is only a rough check on our estimation procedure.
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highest markups in their home countries. Volkswagen (VW) in Germany, General Motors (GM) in
the United States, and most strikingly Peugeot (PSA) in France and Fiat in Italy. The pattern of
home country markups relative to markups of the same firm in other countries is consistent with
demand drivers playing an important role for home market advantage. Overall, the model produces
intuitive estimates of markups—and hence marginal costs—across countries and models.
4.4 Supply Parameterization and Estimation
In the second stage of our estimation procedure, we use the costs implied by the demand model to
estimate the supply side using nonlinear least squares. To do so, we parameterize c1(hjmt, κ) and
c2(gjm`t, δ), which determine the costs associated with selling model j in market m and the costs
associated with sourcing model j from assembly location `, respectively.
For country-model-specific costs, we assume,
log c1(hjmt, κ) = κ
hp log hpjmt + κ
wt log wtjmt + κ
sz log sizejmt (11)
+ κmg log mpgjmt + κmt + κj .
As opposed to the demand side, we allow costs to be determined by horsepower and weight sep-
arately, rather than by their ratio. This is intuitive because we would expect both to increase
the cost of a car, whereas on the demand side we use their ratio as a measure of acceleration
while accounting for size separately. We also include miles per gallon (mpg)—rather than miles per
dollar—on the cost side. This is because the price of gas in m should affect demand for fuel-efficient
vehicles, but not the cost of producing fuel-efficient vehicles. Finally, the supply side includes mar-
ket country-year and model fixed effects. In contrast, the demand side includes brand-country
effects. We prefer this specification because it allows us to control for the substantial variation in
unobserved costs of models within brands on the supply side while being flexible about how tastes
for brands vary across countries on the demand side.32
32We have also estimated several alternative specifications, including model fixed effects on both demand and
supply sides and country-brand effects on both sides. The results are qualitatively similar. Note that the effect of
characteristics on cost are still identified when model fixed effects are included on the supply side, due to variation
in the characteristics of a model both across countries and across years.
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The final element of the supply side is the assembly-location-specific cost function c2(gjm`t, δ),
log c2(gjm`t, δ) = δ
mdist log distm` + δ
dom1[` = m] + δhqdist log disth(j)` (12)
+ log(1 + δtrf · tariffm`t) + δxr log fxrate`t + δ`.
The first two terms capture the effect of trade costs, including a direct effect of distance as well
as a dummy to control for domestic trade, in a traditional iceberg-like fashion.33 The next term,
δhqdist log disth(j)`, accounts for the impact of distance between a firm’s headquarters and the as-
sembly location. Costs may be larger for distant plants due to monitoring or communication costs
between a headquarters and its plants, or due to shipment of intermediate inputs.34 The parameter
δtrf captures the proportion of the model’s cost subject to import tariffs.35 Import tariffs are ad
valorem based on the reported port cost of the car, which is likely to be lower than the marginal
cost of the car implied by profit maximization, since the latter includes internal shipment and mar-
keting costs. Below, we estimate the model both holding δtrf fixed at one (the case where tariffs
are paid on the full marginal cost) and allowing it to be estimated. We would expect only a portion
of the marginal cost to be applied to the tariff, if a significant fraction of the marginal cost were
incurred within the market country, due to distribution / retailing costs. The second to last term,
δxr log fxrate`t captures the effect of exchange rate variation in source locations to costs. fxrate`t
is local currency per USD, normalized to one for the base year 2007. A depreciation of assembly
country currencies would decrease dollar costs if δxr < 0. Finally, we control for productivity dif-
ferences across assembly locations with a location fixed effect, δ`, which is common to all plants
within a country. This term absorbs both productivity difference across assembly countries and
measurement error of internal distances within the assembly country.
The vector of supply parameters to estimate is θs = (κ, δ, σν). The estimator for the supply
33Recall that we use internal distance when the assembly and market countries are the same (` = m), see footnote
9 in Section 2 for details.
34See Giroud (2013) and Tintelnot (2017) for a discussion and evidence for such frictions.
35While identification comes mainly from the cross-section, there is also time variation in tariffs due to several
events during the data period: some assembly countries become a member of the World Trade Organization (Ukraine’s
entry in 2008), the EU and US reclassify countries in their Generalized System of Preferences and, finally, free trade
agreements come into force (EU-Korea FTA in 2011).
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side is the minimizer of the nonlinear least squares objective function,
θˆs = argmin
θs
M∑
m=1
Tm∑
t=1
Jmt∑
j=1
ωjmt(θ
s)2,
where,
ωjmt(θ
s) = log cˆjmt − log c1(hjmt, κ) + σν log
 ∑
k∈Lt(j)
exp
(− log c2(gjmkt, δ)
σν
) .
To account for the fact that marginal costs cˆjmt are functions of demand estimates, standard errors
are calculated using a weighted bootstrap across both demand and supply stages.
In practice, we find that the objective function is minimized at low values of σˆν , indicating
that the gains to variety are very small. For such values of σν , the probability of sourcing from
any particular location converges to either one or zero depending on whether that location is the
minimum cost supplier or not. At low values of σν , model predictions about marginal costs become
insensitive to variation in σν . As a result, the objective function becomes almost flat in this region,
although other parameters are precisely estimated. Therefore, we fix σ¯ν = 0.01 and estimate the
remaining parameters of the model.36 A low estimate of σν is consistent with the findings of Head
and Mayer (2016), who report that at the model level, firms almost always source a specific market
from a single origin country.
4.5 Supply Estimates
The estimates of the supply side are presented in Table 12. Considering the effect of characteristics
on the cost side (top panel), horsepower, size, weight and fuel efficiency all have the expected
sign and are statistically significant. Turning to sourcing costs (bottom panel, columns II-V),
we find that for our preferred specification (column V), production at a domestic (δdom) plant
decreases costs. The cost elasticity of distance, δmdist, is comparable to the estimate of Head and
Mayer (2016)—0.036—and within the range of estimates summarized by Head and Mayer (2013).
It is slightly lower than the estimate from the reduced form price regression in Table 7, which
36The estimates and counterfactual results are robust to fixing σν within a range of [0.001,0.2]. Moreover, an
LR-type test rejects σν > 0.2 at the 95% confidence level.
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Table 12: Marginal cost estimates
I II III IV V
Horsepower, κhp 0.376 0.300 0.300 0.317 0.316
(0.054) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
Weight, κwt 0.185 0.151 0.151 0.154 0.153
(0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Size, κsz 0.403 0.363 0.363 0.367 0.367
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Miles per gallon, κmg 0.046 0.055 0.056 0.054 0.055
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Assembly-to-market distance, δmdist 0.004 0.004 0.016 0.016
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Domestic assembly, δdom -0.008 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Assembly-to-HQ distance, δhqdist -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Tariff, δtrf 0.686 0.682
(0.060) (0.063)
FX rate, δxr -0.013 -0.019
(0.015) (0.015)
Fixed σν - 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: Estimates of the supply function specified in Section 4.4. Car costs, distance measures,
tariff, and car characteristics are in logarithm. The coefficient on tariff, δtrf , is fixed to one in
columns II and III. Weighted bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
could be interpreted as a cost elasticity under the assumption of perfect competition where firms
always source from the nearest location. Assembly-to-HQ distances (δhqdist) increase marginal
costs, consistent with non-trivial monitoring and management costs related to remote production.
However, this effect is smaller than the assembly to market cost elasticity and is not statistically
significant.
We also find that properly controlling for tariffs matters for the magnitude of these effects. In
Columns II-III, the tariff incidence parameter, δtrf , is fixed at one—so the tariff applies to the full
marginal cost of the car—and in Columns IV-V, we allow δtrf to be estimated. When estimating
δtrf , we find that it is significantly below one, implying that the tariff is applied to less than the full
marginal cost of the car, consistent with the presence of a portion of marginal costs being to due
destination-specific internal delivery and marketing. Estimating δtrf also has a substantial effect on
the estimates of trade costs. In particular, the cost of assembly-to-market distance (δmdist) is four
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times larger when tariffs are controlled for (from column II to IV). At the same time, the benefits of
being domestic decrease substantially. This is intuitive because tariff rates are positively correlated
with distance. Moreover, tariffs are naturally zero when the assembly plant is domestic, and they
tend to be low between contiguous countries due to regional trade agreements. As a consequence,
fixing the tariff incidence parameter above its estimated value induces downward bias on the impact
of distance and an upward bias on the benefits of domesticity. The exchange rate parameter δxr in
columns III and V is negative as expected, though small in magnitude (a 10 percent depreciation
of the assembly country currency would decrease total production costs – which includes costs
incurred in the assembly, market, and possibly other supplier countries – by about 0.19 percent).
From column IV to V, its inclusion does not significantly alter other estimates.
Our model delivers implied trade flows between countries at the model level through equations
(3) and (4). We conduct an out-of-sample test of our cost estimates by investigating how well
they match empirical aggregate trade flows. Specifically, we aggregate model-level flows up to the
country-pair level and compare them to trade flows reported in the WITS database of the World
Bank.37 Figure 1 presents the scatter plot comparing our implied trade flows (in logs) with those
in the trade data together with the best linear predictor of the data given our model flows. If
our model perfectly replicated the aggregate data, the estimated slope of this regression would
be exactly one, and R2 would be one. In fact, the regression estimates a slope of 0.69, and the
R2 of this regression is 0.44. There are many reasons why we fail to match the aggregated trade
flows perfectly. Our costs are not intended to represent accounting costs reported to customs upon
import, but are instead the marginal costs the firm uses for setting prices—including costs incurred
internal to the market country. Moreover, there is likely measurement error in both the aggregated
trade flow data and in our data on market shares and prices used to estimate our model.38 Finally,
some mis-specification of our parametric functional forms used in estimation is inevitable. Overall,
we believe the fact that the implied flow data matches the aggregate data as well as it does provides
some degree of confidence that the model is capturing the essential drivers of market outcomes.
As an additional external validity check, we compare model-generated import shares in total
37This data is trade flows reported by importers in HS6 product categories associated with assembled cars. See
Appendix A.4 for details.
38Moreover, our model prices, shares and characteristics are themselves aggregations of finer trim-level data on
new automobile sales.
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Figure 1: Predicted trade flows and data
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Table 13: Import share in sales
Model Data Model Data
BRA 0.136 0.180 FRA 0.799 0.789
CAN 0.740 0.658 GBR 0.886 0.978
DEU 0.573 0.813 ITA 0.864 0.812
ESP 0.761 0.815 USA 0.525 0.453
Notes: Imported units divided by total units sold. See Appendix A.4 for de-
tails. For Belgium, model prediction is 0.949 versus the empirical value of
2.658, which is greater than one due to high level of re-exports.
sales with their empirical counterparts in Table 13. For each market, the ratios are total imported
units divided by total units sold over the data period. Except for Belgium, the model captures the
level of import penetration quite well: the correlation between data and model-generated ratios is
0.91.39
39Being a gateway to Europe, Belgium has a high level of re-exports, resulting in high gross imports which are
not sold domestically—hence an import/sales ratio greater than one. The correlation between empirical and model-
generated import penetration is 0.65 if we include Belgium.
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5 What Drives Home Market Advantage?
In Section 2, we illustrated that firms tend to have substantially larger market shares in their home
market. In Sections 3 and 4, we proposed and estimated a structural model that accounts for various
demand and supply channels that could generate this home market advantage. These include tariffs,
trade and remote production costs, cross-country heterogeneity in tastes for characteristics, and a
preference for domestic brands. In this section, we use these estimates to asses the role of each in
contributing to the home market advantage.
To do so, we re-estimate the same regression across a series of counterfactuals:
log(sjmt) = λ · 1[b(j) is a home brand in m] + αj + γmt + εjmt, (13)
where the parameter λ measures the extent of “home market advantage.” We do not interpret λ
causally, but instead use it as a metric of how home brands correlate with higher market shares
in the data. Prices and market shares exactly match the data at the structural estimates, so the
results from this exercise under the baseline are equivalent to our preliminary analysis in Section 2
(Table 4, Column 3), which implies that brands have on average 238 percent higher market share
(i.e., more than triple) at home versus abroad. For each counterfactual, we re-calculate equilibrium
costs, prices, and market shares, holding fixed model offerings within each market and the set of
available assembly locations for each model.40 However, we allow firms to re-optimize their sourcing
decisions from this set. Therefore, these counterfactuals should be interpreted as “medium run”
in the sense that firms can adjust sourcing and prices but neither the entry/exit of models into
markets nor the construction/closure of assembly plants. Using these counterfactual market shares,
we re-estimate equation (13) to determine the change in the home market advantage. Clearly, some
of these counterfactuals do not represent changes that are achievable via policy. However, our goal
is to use them as thought experiments to illustrate the drivers of home market advantage.
Table 14 displays the results. The first column reports the estimated coefficients under each
counterfactual. The second column reports the implied change in the market share difference
40As is well known, discrete choice demand models with consumer heterogeneity in tastes for characteristics and
price could have multiple equilibria in the pricing game. We have not found such multiple equilibria for our estimates,
but we also cannot rule out that they occur. We use the iterated best response algorithm starting from the initial
equilibrium in order to compute the new equilibrium.
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Table 14: Home market advantage under counterfactual scenarios
Coefficient Home
λ Market
Advantage
(% Chg)
Baseline 1.22
Supply:
All tariffs eliminated 1.18 -4.9
No international trade frictions 1.09 -17.6
No multinational production frictions 1.22 -0.4
No tariffs, trade or multinational production frictions 1.08 -18.5
Market access and prices of complementary goods:
Equalized dealer networks 1.04 -22.8
All countries have German gas prices 1.23 1.5
Demand:
No home preference 0.82 -46.7
No local assembly preference 0.98 -30.7
No local assembly and no home preference 0.57 -67.6
Notes: Since prices and market shares exactly match the data at the structural estimates, the baseline λ
number follows from estimating equation 13 using the actual data and corresponds to column III of Table
4. Counterfactuals use the parameters from Table 8, column V of Table 9, and column V of Table 12.
The second column reports changes in the home market advantage statistic (100× (exp(λ)− 1)).
between the baseline and the counterfactual estimate of λ. We now discuss each of the scenarios
in turn.41 The baseline parameters which we modify below are the estimates in Table 8, column V
of Table 9, and column V of Table 12.
Supply We begin by examining supply-side explanations for the home market advantage.
In general, we would expect trade and foreign investment frictions to lead to cost differences that
favor home brands. However, we do account for the fact that brands offshore the production of
some models sold in their home market. Nonetheless, the home market advantage declines in all of
our scenarios where we remove supply-side frictions.
We first consider the removal of all tariffs on automobile trade. This results in a slight decline
in home market advantage of 5 percent. One reason for this is that many popular models of foreign
brands are either produced domestically or in countries against which tariffs are already low—if not
zero—due to regional free trade agreements. As a result, eliminating tariffs has only a minor effect
41We present brand-country level market shares under each counterfactual in Appendix B.4. Price and profit
outcomes are available from the authors by request.
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on costs, which feeds through to a small decline in home market advantage. The effect increases
when we remove the impact of both tariffs and shipping costs from the model. The impact of
external shipping costs is removed by reducing shipping costs to their domestic level regardless of
assembly plant location. Again we allow firms to re-optimize their pricing and sourcing decisions.
In the new equilibrium, we find a 17.6 percent decline in the home market advantage relative to the
baseline. Next, we consider the impact of remote production frictions on the model. Eliminating
costs associated with the distance between assembly plants and headquarters location, has only
a small effect on home market advantage, which declines by 0.4 percent. Finally, we consider a
reduction in all cost-side trade and foreign investment frictions in concert. Overall, when we remove
all cost-side frictions, the home market advantage statistic declines by 18.5 percent. This suggests
that cost-side drivers are an important but far from complete driver of home market advantage.
Market access and prices of complementary goods We next investigate how much
of home market advantage is driven by differences in sales networks and prices of complementary
goods. Foreign firms tend to have fewer dealers and service operations, lowering the utility of
potential buyers of these brands. This is the outcome of an endogenous process that unfolds over
decades, wherein dealer networks are optimized given consumer preferences (among them home
preference). This endogenous choice of networks is likely to amplify home market advantage. To
explore this, we equalize the dealer density across brands (we set it equal to the median dealer
density observed in the data in each country) and re-solve the model. While the assumed dealer
networks are not optimal in the long run, this exercise gives us a quantification of the importance of
dealer networks in a medium run where they are difficult to adjust. We find that the home market
advantage statistic would fall by 22.8 percent. This suggests that differences in sunk investment in
retailing (and possibly advertising) are important sources of the observed home market advantage.
We next consider the impact of gas price differences across countries on home market advantage.
Taking the current product offerings as given, home market advantage would increase slightly by
1.5 percent if all countries faced German gas prices, which are the highest gas prices across Europe.
As discussed in Section 2, car makers customize their product offerings to the local car market.
Therefore it is not surprising that differences in the price of gas across countries cannot explain the
observed home market advantage since most foreign brands offer products that comport with local
39
tastes—at in terms of fuel economy.
Demand Finally in Table 14, we remove consumers’ direct preference for home brands by
eliminating the structural home preference (i.e., ρ1 = 0). We find that eliminating home preference
alone, while maintaining local assembly preferences that are almost universally enjoyed by local
brands, has a dramatic effect on the home market advantage, which falls by 46.7 percent. Note that
this calculation controls for the fact that home brands tend to have more dealerships and a longer
history in their own home country. Home brands, as well as selected foreign brands, also have
local assembly. If we eliminate the preference for local assembly (ρ2 = 0), home market advantage
falls by 30.7 percent. In the case of eliminating both home preference and taste for local assembly
(ρ1 = ρ2 = 0), home market advantage falls by 67.6 percent. This leads us to conclude that
demand-side effects, and home brand preference in particular, are the key channel that gives rise
to home market advantage in the automobile industry in the medium run, while cost-side elements
play a substantive but secondary role.
The value of a domestic brand An interesting feature of the automobile industry is that
there have been several mergers where an international firm owns a domestic brand but maintains its
“domestic” image in marketing campaigns (e.g., Volkswagen’s ownership of SEAT in Spain, GM’s
ownership of Vauxhall and Opel in the UK and Germany, and Fiat’s recent purchase of Chrysler
in the United States). Our results suggest that one benefit of operating “domestic” brands for
foreign firms is due to consumers’ preferences for local brands. Hence home preference can provide
a motive for foreign direct investment (via acquiring local brands), analogous to jumping tariffs by
establishing foreign production. To explore this idea in more detail, we use our model to calculate
the importance of brand-nationality to the profitability of home brands. Specifically, we remove
the home preference from only the brand under consideration and re-calculate the equilibrium
to see the impact of home preference on that brand. For this exercise, we use country-specific
home preference estimates from Table 10 to highlight cross-country differences. Table 15 reports
how removing home preference affects local brands’ prices, sales and profitability in their home
country. The upper panel considers foreign-owned brands, while the lower panel lists the largest
home brand in the country.42 We find that home preference is extremely important to domestic
42SEAT and Vauxhall are both foreign-owned and the largest brand in their home country, so we do not repeat
them.
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Table 15: Value of domestic brand status for selected
brands
Percent Change in
Price Quantity Profit
Seat in Spain (VW) -0.4 -59.6 -61.9
Vauxhall in UK (GM) -0.2 -17.1 -19.4
Chrysler in US (Fiat) -0.1 -23.8 -24.3
Opel in Germany (GM) -0.2 -27.8 -29.4
VW in Germany -0.4 -25.2 -28.0
Renault in France -1.0 -45.6 -50.7
Fiat in Italy -1.3 -46.6 -53.4
Chevrolet in US -0.3 -21.8 -23.2
brands’ operating profits. Although firms do react to the loss of home preference by lowering prices
slightly,43 the reduction in profits is largely due to a dramatic reduction in sales when the home
preference is removed. The effect varies substantially by brand. The largest profit loss occurs at
the Spanish brand SEAT (62 percent), which is owned by Volkswagen but has a relatively small
presence worldwide. Despite being foreign-owned, SEAT appears to actively cultivate a Spanish
identity to the extent of offering models named the Leon, Toledo, and Alhambra. In contrast,
Volkswagen itself—a strong worldwide brand—loses a comparably modest 28 percent of its local
operating profits when its home preference is eliminated in Germany. In summary, the impact of
home preference does appear large enough to suggest that buying a local brand may be an attractive
mode of entry for foreign firms due to consumers’ innate preference for local brands.
The demand and cost effects of FDI Instead of acquiring a local brand in a foreign
market, firms often simply establish foreign assembly operations. Our estimates suggest that such
foreign investment has both a cost reducing effect (due to closer proximity to the market and
possibly cheaper production costs) and a demand effect (due to consumers’ valuation of local
assembly). Consider for example the case of Toyota in the US. Suppose Toyota removed all its
US operations. How would its (variable) profits in the US market be affected?44 We disentangle
the total effect by the following thought experiment. Suppose Toyota’s US assembly plants were
43Recall that markups are typically below 10 percent (see Table 11), so a one percent change in price represents
roughly a 10 percent change in the markup since costs are unchanged in this counterfactual.
44Since we have not estimated the fixed costs of foreign plants, we can only analyze changes in Toyota’s variable
profit.
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Table 16: Demand and cost effects of FDI for selected brands
Percent Change in
Price Quantity Profit
Removing Toyota plants in US
No local assembly preference -0.4 -24.4 -28.5
Only cost effect 1.9 -14.2 -17.1
Combined 0.9 -35.7 -41.1
Removing Ford plants in Germany
No local assembly preference -0.2 -29.2 -30.8
Only cost effect 1.0 -11.9 -10.6
Combined 1.5 -38.0 -38.3
removed, but Toyota would still be conceived of consumers as a brand with local assembly. This
counterfactual scenario yields what we term the “cost effect of FDI”.45 As shown in Table 16, we
find that Toyota’s US profits would fall by 17 percent under such circumstances. If instead Toyota
is no longer valued as a local producer, but maintained its assembly locations on the supply side,
this gives us the “demand effect of FDI.” We find that Toyota’s profits in the US would fall by 29
percent without the demand effect of FDI. Combining the effects leads to 41 percent lower profits
by Toyota in the US. We have similarly analyzed the profits of Ford in Germany (also shown in
Table 16). The effects are qualitatively similar, with the demand effect of FDI exceeding the cost
effect. We think that the demand effect of FDI deserves further investigation as a novel channel
unaccounted for by the standard theories on multinational firms.
6 Conclusion
The automobile industry exhibits significant home market advantage in market shares. This paper
proposes and estimates a structural model to disentangle the contribution of various demand-
and cost-side elements to market outcomes. The estimates clearly establish the existence of both
demand factors and supply frictions behind the empirical regularity of home market advantage.
On the demand side, consumers exhibit preference for their national brands relative to how these
brands are viewed in the rest of the world, even after controlling for car and brand characteristics.
45Whenever a model has multiple assembly locations, we drop the US assembly location in the counterfactual.
Whenever the only assembly location for a model is in the US, we move the assembly location in the counterfactual
to Japan.
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They also show preference for brands with a local production presence. Moreover, there are distinct
differences in tastes for characteristics across countries. On the cost side, tariffs, trade costs, and
remote production costs all play a role in segmenting markets.
To establish the relative importance of these channels, we conduct a series of counterfactual
experiments isolating each feature of the model. Removing all tariffs, trade and multinational
frictions, i.e., supply factors, explains around 18.5 percent of home market advantage. Another
aspect of market penetration, the density of the dealers, has an equally important role. Equalizing
dealer networks reduces home market advantage by 22.8 percent. It turns out that, however, home
preference in demand is the major driver of the home market advantage, with an effect roughly
twice as large as removing all cost-side frictions. Together with preference for local assembly, these
demand side factors explain around two-thirds of home market advantage. Quantitative models
that ignore such strong demand side effects are prone to overestimating trade and multinational
production costs.
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Appendices
Appendix A Data
A.1 Demand Data
We purchased a dataset of trim-level unit sales, prices (MSRP) and characteristics (size, weight,
horsepower, fuel type, transmission, wheel base) for nine markets (Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, US) and five years (2007-2011) from R.L.Polk & Company, a market
research firm that got acquired by IHS Inc. in 2013. Data for the years 2007 and 2008 are missing
for Brazil and Canada, respectively. Following the common practice in the literature, we aggregated
sales to the model level since very small market shares at the trim level create numerical challenges
for the BLP inversion. The aggregation used trim-level sales as weights to calculate average model
prices and characteristics. We fill in the few cases of missing characteristics (most notably in
Brazil), with the characteristics of the same models from the North American market. Prices at
local currencies were translated into USD using the average annual exchange rate. In countries with
a retail sales tax, we augment this price with the retail sales tax so it approximates the effective
price to the consumer. This procedure generated 9,498 observations. We dropped pickup trucks
since they constitute a somewhat unique segment in the US. We also dropped observations for
2010-2011 in Canada since information on SUV models sold there in these years was missing. This
leaves us with 8,841 observations. Additional data come from OECD (sales tax data), Penn World
Tables Version 8 (income per capita in 2005 PPP, price levels of GDP, exchange rates), and the
World Bank (Gini coefficients)
All nominal variables in the data, MSRP and gas prices in each market-year, have been deflated
to 2005 US dollars to be consistent with the PPP income per capita variable denominated in 2005
US dollars. All variables are first deflated to their 2005 levels using price level time series from the
Penn World Tables, and then converted to USD using the nominal exchange rate of the year.
A.2 Supply Data
To locate the production locations of unique model-year combinations in the demand data, we
purchased data on assembly plants by manufacturer groups and models between 2007-2011 from
Ward’s Communications. Assembly countries for model-years present in the demand data but
missing in the purchased supply data were collected by research assistants from the Internet. The
complete supply data encompasses 52 assembly countries. The models produced in Uruguay belong
to the Chinese brand Geely for which fuel efficiency measures are missing. As a result, we drop
Uruguay as an assembly location. Also, data for Kenya and Bangladesh overlap in that Toyota
Land Cruiser is the only model produced in these countries. Since this leads to multicollinearity in
estimating model and production location fixed effects, we drop Bangladesh. This leaves us with
50 countries from which the models in the demand data could be supplied. The countries in which
manufacturer groups are headquartered constitute another dimension of the data, which is more
easily accessible from online sources. There are 12 headquarter countries associated with the 28
manufacturing groups: China, Germany, Spain, France, the UK, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
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Russia, Sweden and the US.46 The CEPII dataset (Head and Mayer 2013) provides us with the
distances between headquarter and assembly countries, as well as the distance and the contiguity
of our nine markets to assembly countries. Bilateral tariff data come from TARIC (EU Integrated
Tariff Database), Canada Border Services Agency, USITC and WITS databases. Most of the
bilateral tariffs were constant throughout the data period with two exceptions. The entry of
Ukraine to the WTO led to a reduction of US tariffs from 10% to the MFN level of 2.5%. EU
tariffs to S. Korea decreased from 10% to 3% in 2011 when a free trade agreement became effective.
We ignore rules of origin requirements related to the regional value-added content in FTAs: for
instance, according to NAFTA rules, a car can be imported from Mexico to the US tariff-free only
if the regional value-added content is above 62.5%. The rest is subject to tariff. Unfortunately,
systematic model-level data on location-specific value-added is not available. In our cost estimation
(subsection 4.5 ), we make an attempt to account for the fact that only a fraction of an imported
car’s cost is subject to import tariffs.
In order to investigate the sources of the brand-country fixed effects from the demand estimation,
we supplement the demand data with information on brands’ years of entry into and the number of
their dealers in each of our 9 markets. The year-of-entry data was collected by consulting various
sources including the Internet, business history books and companies’ public relations agents. Data
regarding the number of dealers was collected from Google Maps. There are 331 brand-country
observations.
The number of car dealers for a manufacturer brand within a country is collected using Google
Places API (https://developers.google.com/places/webservice/search?hl=en). This API
provides a function called radar search that returns the search query given the key words, place
types, center coordinates and radius of the area of interest. The query has detailed information
including place id that can uniquely identify a place, coordinates and description. There is a limit
to the number of results returned per search (200) and also the radius (50km). We set the keyword
to be the name of the manufacturer brand and the place type to be “car dealer.”47 Then we iterated
over areas to cover the entire country by choosing different coordinate centers and set the radius
to 50km. The area may cover places outside of the country, in which case we removed these results
based on their coordinates. There may also be overlapped area search in the search iteration, and
we removed the repeated results using place id. To avoid counting dealers of used cars, we did a
radar search using used car as the keyword, and deleted a place if its id is found in the used car
list.
A.3 Gas Prices
We collected data on unit price at the pump for gasoline, diesel and ethanol in all our markets.
Data sources are the websites of the US Energy Information Administration, Natural Resources
Canada, European Commission, and the Brazilian National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and
Biofuels (ANP). Fuel market shares in each country and year are used as weights in calculating
average gas prices.
46For two manufacturing groups, Chrysler-Fiat and Renault-Nissan, we assigned each firm a separate headquarter
country: Chrysler in the US and Fiat in Italy, Renault in France and Nissan in Japan. During this period, key
managerial decisions at Chrysler were still made in Detroit and the merger of the two companies wasn’t legally
complete until 2014. Similarly, while the Renault-Nissan alliance coordinates global procurement, production and
marketing, they still keep their separate management structures and brand identities.
47Because Opel is a common location name in some countries, we use “Opel dealer” instead of “Opel” in the
search, where “dealer” is translated into the local language.
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A.4 Trade Flows and Import Shares in Sales
In Figure 1, we use data downloaded from wits.worldbank.org on USD car import values from
each source country to each of the nine markets. We work with HS6 product categories associated
with assembled cars. This spans all the subheadings under 2007 HS 4-digit heading 8703 (Motor
cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons) excluding 870310
(Vehicles specially designed for traveling on snow; golf carts and similar vehicles). These HS product
codes are: 870321, 870322, 870323, 870324, 870331, 870332, 870333, and 870390. Trucks are not
included in this data as they are classified under HS 8704, “motor vehicles for the transport of
goods”. This data includes many small flows due to personal imports of automobiles, so we exclude
pairs with less than $5 million in reported flows, which amounts to roughly 200 units. The reported
results are robust to adjusting this cutoff.
In table 13, we use data downloaded from wits.worldbank.org on units of vehicles imported
to each of the nine markets. Total units sold by market-year are downloaded from Marklines.com.
Appendix B Additional Figures and Tables
B.1 Analysis of Price Discounts
As is well known, transaction prices can differ from the manufacturer’s suggested retail price, which
introduces some measurement error into our price variable. Also, at least anecdotally, brands are
known to differ in their discount policies. In this Appendix section, we analyze whether home
brands differ systematically from foreign brands in their discount behavior. We downloaded online
car prices for US, Germany, and France during the period December 2015 to February 2016.48
We analyze discount behavior across the three countries. The left hand side variable is the price
discount (online priceMSRP − 1). On the right hand side, we interact a dummy variable whether a brand
is at home with a country dummy and include country fixed effects in the regression. We find that
German brands tend to give smaller discounts (note that discount is a negative number so a positive
coefficient implies smaller discounts), while French and US brands tend to give larger discounts.
Importantly, though, brands do not systematically give larger discounts in their home market than
in foreign markets as illustrated by the insignificant results for the home brand variables in the
results in columns II and III when global model or brand fixed effects are included. Hence the
global brand fixed effects in our demand estimation will absorb differences in the brands’ discount
behavior.
48Aggregate pricing data for the US was taken from www.truecar.com on December 22, 2015 in 5 cities (Philadel-
phia, Los Angeles, Washington D.C., and Dallas) and reflect the base car model. Aggregate pricing data for Germany
was taken from www.autohaus24.de on January 23, 2016 and reflect the base car model. Pricing data for France was
taken from www.promoneuve.fr on February 8, 2016 in every region and include car styles and possible optional
equipment, where authorized dealers post prices for new cars. Pricing discounts for each country are calculated by
first calculating the average price of the car model and MSRP for unique models and then calculating the discount.
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Table B.1: Online price discounts
Separate by country Global model fixed effect Global brand fixed effect
I II III
discount discount discount
Home brand in USA -0.0173 -0.000689 0.00633
(0.00846) (0.0205) (0.0157)
Home brand in Germany 0.0199 -0.00449 0.00820
(0.00841) (0.00970) (0.00948)
Home brand in France -0.0390 0.00968 -0.0168
(0.0108) (0.0147) (0.0145)
Observations 803 803 803
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Model Fixed Effect No Yes No
Brand Fixed Effect No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
B.2 Descriptive Evidence
Figure B.1: Models and market shares by number of assembly countries
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Table B.2: Average characteristics by market and brand origin
sales weighted hppwt of brands from
Market DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA Other
BEL 62.56 52.68 53.62 71.15 56.33 55.08 58.34
BRA 59.95 . 60.1 90.54 56.32 62.35 77.03
CAN 101.14 . . 97.55 . 93.82 89.42
DEU 71.43 60.07 59.53 77.24 54.98 60.03 61.53
ESP 66.65 58.88 55.53 72.41 57.78 58.57 61.96
FRA 64.18 57.89 54.36 75.93 57.08 54.46 58.09
GBR 76.06 61.03 57.3 66.29 54.27 59.79 64.41
ITA 66.18 54.58 52.95 73.03 52.77 54.26 58.69
USA 110.36 . . 106.5 71.07 99.81 94.42
sales weighted size of brands from
Market DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA Other
BEL 7.87 7.29 7.42 7.35 6.89 7.73 7.4
BRA 6.63 . 7.05 8.53 6.44 6.84 7.76
CAN 8.01 . . 7.47 . 8.78 8.13
DEU 7.85 7.33 7.21 6.91 6.46 7.68 7.29
ESP 7.8 7.02 7.6 7.34 6.84 7.75 7.58
FRA 7.64 7.23 7.29 6.93 6.46 7.42 7.22
GBR 7.92 7.31 7.19 7.65 6.54 7.59 7.32
ITA 7.46 7.2 7.01 7.41 6.49 7.2 7.03
USA 8.54 . . 7.82 5.77 9.01 8.5
sales weighted mpg of brands from
Market DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA Other
BEL 33.32 38.28 35.54 33.46 36.83 34.89 34.19
BRA 27.89 . 32.6 23.34 27.77 32.95 29.37
CAN 20.79 . . 21.93 . 19.94 23.65
DEU 28.8 28.88 30.37 29.49 32.34 29.3 29.94
ESP 31.31 34.62 34.06 27.26 33.19 32.01 30.99
FRA 33.77 35.72 36.33 32.56 35.41 35.57 34.82
GBR 29.7 30.49 32.17 28.7 32.83 29.47 31.37
ITA 31.82 32.47 34.31 31.06 33.63 34.71 33.29
USA 18.98 . . 20.93 28.8 18.91 22.55
Notes: Each cell presents the average level of the characteristic supplied in the market
(rows) by brands from country (column), weighted by their sales in that market. Units
for horsepower per weight (hppwt), size and miles per gallon (mpg) are the same as in
Table 5 in the paper.
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Table B.3: Characteristics by market within models
I II III
ln(hppwtjmt) ln(sizejmt) ln(mpgjmt)
BEL -0.276 -0.009 0.253
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
BRA -0.043 0.00308 0.188
(0.0111) (0.004) (0.008)
CAN -0.0001 0.0008 0.0156
(0.006) (0.001) (0.005)
DEU -0.195 -0.006 0.157
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
ESP -0.228 -0.007 0.228
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
FRA -0.239 -0.006 0.267
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
GBR -0.210 -0.008 0.189
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
ITA -0.235 -0.008 0.229
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
Observations 8841 8841 8841
R2 0.953 0.985 0.928
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Model FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. US is the omitted dummy, so
all coefficients showcase differences in country means against the US.
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B.3 Model Predictions
B.3.1 Marginal Utility of Characteristics
Table B.4 presents the marginal utility of each characteristic to the median consumer within market
m, using the estimates in the demand estimates Table 8. Featuring a quadratic term, the marginal
utility for size evaluated at sales-weighted average is given by
medi,j,t
(
∂ujmti
∂sizejmt
)
= β¯szm + 2β
sz2
m sizemt.
Marginal utility for horsepower is linear, directly captured by relevant coefficients in Table 8.
Marginal utility for fuel efficiency (mpd) varies with income and given by
medi,j,t
(
∂ujmti
∂mpdjmt
)
= β¯mdm + pi
mdlog[i˜ncmt].
where i˜ncmt is median income in each market.
Table B.4: Marginal utility for characteristics to the median consumer
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
Sale-weighted hppwt 6.21 5.84 9.18 6.66 6.09 5.71 6.56 5.73 9.78
Marginal utility for hppwt 0.22 0.49 -0.01 0.80 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.38 -0.05
Sale-weighted size 6.84 7.57 8.34 7.60 7.59 7.32 7.53 7.00 8.70
Marginal utility for size 6.14 4.44 3.20 4.64 4.50 3.67 3.96 3.97 2.40
Sale-weighted mpd 14.42 6.64 7.68 4.97 7.01 6.73 5.51 6.38 8.19
Marginal utility for mpd 0.82 0.11 0.03 0.15 -0.57 0.05 0.21 -0.13 0.00
B.3.2 Elasticities and Markups
Table B.5 presents the elasticities and cross-elasticities for selected models in the subset of markets
where these models compete. Looking at the own-price elasticities, we see they vary mildly across
models. When we consider the cross-elasticities, the table illustrates that the model is able to
capture the expected competitive patterns. The two luxury models, the Audi A6 and Mercedes
E350, compete most strongly with each other. Similarly, Renault Clio, Toyota Corolla, and Ford
Focus compete strongly with each other but not with the luxury vehicles.
Table B.6 presents the median (across years) of the implied markups for a selection of models in
all countries where those models appear. Intuitively, markups are lowest in Brazil, which is by far
the lowest income country in our dataset. Several smaller models such as the VW Golf, Mini, and
Ford Fiesta tend to have smaller markups in the United States than they do in European countries.
The overall pattern of brands tending to have higher markups in their home country is also apparent
in this table, although the popularity of model characteristics and product competition also clearly
affects markups.
B.3.3 Trade and Foreign Production Frictions
To get a sense for the magnitude of the estimated trade frictions, we conduct two exercises which
calculate the proportion of automobile costs that are due to external shipping and remote produc-
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Table B.5: Median own and cross-price elasticities for select models
Audi A6 Ford Focus Mercedes E350 Renault Clio Toyota Corolla
Audi A6 -14.687 0.034 0.433 0.007 0.021
Ford Focus 0.064 -14.473 0.029 0.261 0.471
Mercedes E 350 0.230 0.006 -15.727 0.003 0.001
Renault Clio 0.008 0.311 0.001 -14.090 0.028
Toyota Corolla 0.003 0.483 0.001 0.269 -14.962
Notes: This table shows the substitution elasticity of models in the row with respect to the prices of models
in the column. Each entry represents the median of elasticities across country-years.
Table B.6: Median markups of select models across years (percent)
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
Audi A4 5.8 9.1 8.0 9.8 8.5 9.9 9.3 8.3 9.3
Audi A6 9.0 8.2 8.7 8.2 9.6 9.4 7.7 11.4
BMW 530 7.8 6.7 6.7 8.7 8.8 7.4 10.6
BMW X3 8.1 8.8 7.0 7.1 8.8 8.8 7.3 11.4
Chrysler 300 6.8 9.2 5.6 6.5 8.1 8.3 6.3 10.9
Ford Fiesta 5.4 8.8 9.8 8.2 9.3 8.9 8.8 7.9
Ford Focus 6.0 8.2 8.8 7.7 7.8 8.8 8.9 8.0 8.1
Honda Accord 6.4 7.2 9.1 6.6 6.9 8.3 7.7 6.7 9.8
Honda CR-V 7.8 7.4 9.6 6.6 7.1 8.7 7.9 7.0 9.9
Jaguar XF 6.9 8.0 5.5 6.1 7.7 8.8 6.0 11.9
Jeep Grand Cherokee 6.8 6.8 10.0 5.8 6.4 8.0 8.3 6.3 13.0
Lexus RX 450 5.8 6.9 4.8 4.9 6.8 6.9 5.2 8.5
Mercedes E 350 7.1 7.7 6.8 6.5 8.4 8.2 6.4 12.3
Mini New Mini 6.7 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.4 8.4 7.6 7.4 7.5
Renault Clio 4.6 9.5 9.7 8.6 12.3 8.6 8.6
Toyota Corolla 5.7 8.0 10.3 8.0 7.5 8.5 8.7 7.9 8.9
Toyota RAV-4 6.7 7.5 9.3 6.6 7.0 8.7 7.8 7.2 10.2
VW Golf 6.8 9.4 9.0 11.4 8.8 9.6 9.1 8.6 7.6
VW Passat 6.0 9.1 8.2 10.2 8.8 9.5 8.9 8.6 9.2
VW Tiguan 8.3 9.6 8.8 10.5 9.1 10.3 9.6 8.8 10.0
tion, and showcase how these quantities vary across brands and countries. Note that this analysis
computes costs actually paid in overcoming production frictions. It is not capturing the impact
of production frictions that firms endogenously avoid (e.g., sourcing locally to avoid high tariffs
and shipping costs). In the Section 5, we conduct a series of counterfactuals which allow firms to
re-optimize production decisions when frictions are removed.
Table B.7 reflects the percentage of the total cost that is directly related to external shipping
and domesticity (but not including tariffs). In this exercise, we use the estimates from column IV
of Table 12 to calculate the proportion of costs paid that are due to shipping from an international
location. That is, we calculate the change in total costs when we set the domestic dummy equal
to one and the distance between the assembly countries and the destination market equal to the
internal distance of the destination market. This calculation keeps tariffs, sourcing locations, and
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Table B.7: Weighted average external shipping cost (assembly to market cost, including domestic
assembly effects) as percent of marginal cost
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
Fiat 0.0 5.0 2.5 2.8 2.4 4.0 1.4 2.5
Ford 0.2 3.3 0.6 1.4 2.7 2.1 3.7 2.8 0.2
GM 0.2 4.1 0.6 1.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 2.1 0.2
PSA 0.4 4.4 2.2 1.4 1.3 3.2 2.2
Toyota 0.3 5.6 0.9 3.2 3.5 2.4 3.7 2.8 1.1
VW 0.2 3.9 2.5 1.2 1.5 1.9 3.1 2.0 1.6
the distance between assembly and headquarters the same. We see some variation by firm and
country, ranging between 0 percent (Fiat in Brazil) to 5.6 percent (Toyota in Belgium) of the
marginal cost. As we would expect, these costs tend to be relatively low in the firm’s home
country, despite the fact that even home firms import at least some proportion of their cars from
abroad, generating positive external shipping costs. However, in Brazil, where many firms have
local plants targeting South American markets, average shipping costs are actually lower as a share
of costs than in home countries.49
Table B.8 carries out a similar exercise by computing the proportion of costs due to sourcing
from assembly locations outside the firm’s headquarter country. In this case, we compute the
proportion of additional costs from assembling cars outside of the home headquarter country as
a proportion of the overall cost. Not surprisingly, these costs tend to be smallest in the firm’s
home country, although they are not zero since, again, firms source some models in home markets
from abroad. These costs range from about 0 to about 1 percent of marginal costs of supplying
a model to a market. As with shipping costs, the case of Brazil is especially interesting since
remote assembly costs tend to be highest there. This is the flip side of the low shipping costs for
the Brazilian market observed in Table B.7. Firms are endogenously choosing to locate assembly
locations in Brazil, incurring remote production costs instead of paying higher shipping costs and
high import tariffs to access the Brazilian market.
Table B.8: Weighted average remote production cost as percent of marginal cost
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
Fiat 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.6
Ford 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0
GM 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0
PSA 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Toyota 1.0 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6
VW 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6
49It is also interesting to note that General Motors has its lowest average shipping costs to European markets in
Germany, where its Opel subsidiary is based.
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B.4 Counterfactuals
The following tables present market shares from the baseline model (which exactly matches share
and price data at the model level) and the counterfactual scenarios we consider. Data is aggregated
according to brand nationality.
Table B.9: Data: average area-level market shares of brands across markets (%)
Data/Baseline
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 31.0 8.9 34.1 8.3 11.3 6.6 15.9 11.6 39.6
EU brands 56.6 75.7 8.5 77.0 70.6 82.6 62.8 74.0 9.5
JPN brands 8.3 11.3 48.3 10.9 13.1 8.8 16.9 11.5 42.9
Other brands 4.2 4.0 9.1 3.7 5.1 2.0 4.3 2.9 7.9
Home brands 55.4 9.0 52.3 18.2 30.3 39.6
X
Table B.10: Supply counterfactuals: percentage point changes of average area-level market share
of brands across markets
All tariffs eliminated
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands -8.5 0.7 -5.3 1.1 1.8 0.3 2.3 2.0 -2.7
EU brands -18.7 -4.6 2.9 -5.4 -7.2 -2.1 -7.4 -5.7 2.1
JPN brands -3.5 3.0 0.4 3.6 4.0 1.3 4.2 2.9 -0.4
Other brands 30.7 1.0 2.1 0.7 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.7 1.0
Home brands -5.3 -4.0 0.3 -6.0 -3.6 -2.7
No international trade frictions
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands -0.5 -0.1 -2.9 0.6 1.0 0.2 1.2 1.1 -3.1
EU brands -1.2 -2.8 1.5 -4.3 -5.0 -1.6 -4.7 -3.3 1.4
JPN brands -0.5 2.3 0.3 3.1 3.0 1.1 2.9 1.8 1.0
Other brands 2.1 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.7
Home brands -4.9 -3.1 -0.4 -4.4 -2.3 -3.1
No multinational production frictions
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 0.0 0.4 -0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 -0.4
EU brands 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 0.1
JPN brands 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5
Other brands -0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
Home brands -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.5 -0.4
No tariffs, trade or multinational production frictions
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands -11.0 0.9 -8.5 1.6 2.4 0.5 3.3 3.1 -6.2
EU brands -24.6 -5.6 4.6 -7.0 -9.1 -2.8 -9.8 -7.9 3.9
JPN brands -3.1 3.8 0.9 4.8 5.4 1.9 5.6 4.0 0.6
Other brands 38.7 1.0 3.0 0.7 1.3 0.5 0.9 0.8 1.6
Home brands -6.1 -6.3 0.5 -9.6 -5.8 -6.2
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Table B.11: Market access and prices of complementary goods counterfactuals: percentage point
changes of average area-level market share of brands across markets
Equalize dealer networks
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands -0.8 -0.0 -2.4 -0.8 -0.1 1.1 -0.7 -0.0 -1.4
EU brands 0.8 -0.9 3.3 -1.9 -0.5 -3.3 0.2 -1.0 0.9
JPN brands -0.0 0.4 -1.0 2.1 0.3 1.8 0.3 0.7 0.2
Other brands 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4
Home brands -4.4 -0.8 -9.7 -0.5 -2.8 -1.4
All countries have German gas prices
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands -9.0 -0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.1 -2.0
EU brands 5.8 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 -0.0 0.0
JPN brands 2.7 -0.1 0.5 0.0 -0.8 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 2.2
Other brands 0.6 -0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.2
Home brands 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 -2.0
Table B.12: Demand counterfactuals: percentage point changes of average area-level market share
of brands across markets
No home preference
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.4 1.4 1.1 1.2 -9.6
EU brands 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.9 -0.9 -4.0 -2.6 -2.8 1.8
JPN brands 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.4 2.1 1.2 1.3 6.6
Other brands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.1
Home brands -9.8 -3.2 -10.4 -5.7 -7.0 -9.6
No local assembly preference
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands -0.7 -1.5 -2.8 -1.0 -0.6 1.4 1.5 -1.7 -1.2
EU brands -0.7 -0.2 1.8 -1.8 -2.1 -2.4 0.5 0.0 1.9
JPN brands 0.0 1.3 -0.7 2.2 1.5 0.5 -2.4 1.3 -0.3
Other brands 1.3 0.5 1.6 0.6 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 -0.4
Home brands -6.2 -1.2 -6.7 -3.9 -4.8 -1.2
No local assembly and no home preference
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands -0.7 -1.5 -2.8 0.4 -0.3 2.9 2.5 -0.7 -10.7
EU brands -0.7 -0.2 1.8 -6.4 -3.0 -6.3 -1.6 -2.4 4.0
JPN brands 0.0 1.3 -0.7 4.7 1.9 2.5 -1.5 2.5 6.1
Other brands 1.3 0.5 1.6 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.6
Home brands -15.9 -4.0 -16.8 -8.6 -11.3 -10.7
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B.5 Model Without Taste Heterogeneity
To assess whether the endogenous match of demand for and supply of characteristics drives home
market advantage, we estimated a specification in which consumers in every country have the same
mean and variance of valuations of attributes. Table B.13 below replicates Table 8 in the paper
when the mean and variance of taste parameters are restricted to be uniform across countries. In
this specification, we also make price sensitivity to be invariant to income by restricting piα = 0.
We provide two comparisons between our baseline results and the restricted model without
income sensitivity and taste differences. Under the baseline, keeping all other brand and car-model
characteristics identical, the median consumer’s willingness to pay for a home brand over a foreign
one with domestic assembly is about $600 in the US. When taste heterogeneity and differences
in price sensitivity are shut down, this number drops to $372. In other words, ignoring taste
heterogeneity leads to an understatement of consumers’ willingness to pay for home brands.
Second, Table B.14 quantifies the effect of demand- and supply-driven components of home
market advantage. This enables us to inspect the change in the λ measure for home preference from
estimating equation 13 on the counterfactuals, and as in Table 14 in the paper, draw a comparison
between the importance of supply vs demand factors in accounting for home market advantage.
Evidently, ignoring heterogenous tastes for characteristics does not increase our measure of home
preference or change our conclusion on demand factors being more important than supply-related
barriers. In fact, the effect of home preference is moderately lower under this specification. This
result is consistent with our conjecture in the paper (last paragraph of section 4.2) that brands seem
to have successfully adapted their bundles to local tastes. Table B.2 in Appendix B.2 corroborates
this point by reporting average characteristics by market and brand origin country. Looking within
rows of that table, one notices that bold diagonal values (for matching national brands) do not
stand out as outliers compared to other columns. Another way of saying this is that foreign brands
do not deviate much from averages in each market. Especially, German brands successfully fit to
the American market, and American brands in turn fit to the overall European market. The only
exception is Italian brands: they sell uniformly smaller vehicles with low horsepower per weight
everywhere, while at the same time driving the average in their home market. This is partially
driven by the short history of Italian presence in the US market: Fiat entered the US market very
recently after the acquisition of Chrysler, where it only sells the small Fiat 500. It doesn’t produce
models designed specifically for the American market—either because it has not had the time to
develop such models yet or it doesn’t find it optimal to do so.
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Table B.13: Parameter estimates for the demand model—identical taste for characteristics
Random
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA Coef. Std
HP per Weight ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.582 0.125
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (0.139) (0.160)
MPDCITY ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... -0.571 0.692
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (0.100) (0.097)
Size ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 7.203 0.064
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (1.777) (2.329)
Size Square ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... -0.204
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (0.094)
Random coef. Price Sensitivity Parameters
automobile tastes
σι α σα
0.579 2.286 0.677
(46.878) (0.594) (0.035)
Notes: This table presents the results from a specification that restricts taste for characteristics and price-sensitivity to
be identical across countries. Cells with “...” imply that the coefficient is by construction equal to the estimate reported
in the U.S. column. The units for HP per weight, size, and price are horsepower per 100 kg, m2, and 10 thousand dollars,
respectively. MPDCITY is miles per dollar in city driving. Brand-country dummies are included. Weighted bootstrap
standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table B.14: Home market advantage under counterfactual scenarios—identical taste for
characteristics
Coefficient Home
λ Market
Advantage
(% Chg)
Baseline 1.22
Supply:
All tariffs eliminated 1.17 -6.9
No international trade frictions 1.08 -18.7
No multinational production frictions 1.21 -0.9
No tariffs, trade or multinational production frictions 1.06 -21.3
Market access and prices of complementary goods:
Equalized dealer networks 0.99 -29.0
All countries have German gas prices 1.24 3.4
Demand:
No home preference 0.94 -34.6
No local assembly preference 0.97 -31.4
No local assembly and no home preference 0.69 -58.6
Notes: This table presents the results from counterfactual exercises for a specification that restricts taste
for characteristics and price-sensitivity to be identical across countries. It uses the estimates from Table
B.13 and is comparable to Table 14 in the paper. Since prices and market shares exactly match the data
at the structural estimates, the baseline λ number follows from estimating equation 13 using the actual
data and corresponds to column III of Table 4. The second column reports changes in the home market
advantage statistic (100× (exp(λ)− 1)).
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